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Abstract: Corporate mobility and choice of law within the EU has dominated 
much of the academic writing in European company law over the last decades. 
What has not yet received much attention is the way in which national company 
law interacts with and depends on features of the national legal system outside of 
company law. In this article we explore this interaction and its relevance for 
coherent national regulatory systems.  
Using the regulatory framework for companies in the ‘vicinity of insolvency’ 
as an example, we show how choice of company law can create both regulatory 
gaps and multiplication of legal requirements, as private international law rules are 
applied inconsistently across Europe. More importantly, however, we show that 
even consistent application of conflicts rules would fail to resolve these problems 
due to cross-doctrinal interdependence within any national legal system.  
We conclude that this is a design flaw in the way EU law deals with the 
increasingly international reach of corporations, and discuss possible paths for 
resolving or mitigating this issue. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
 
The increase in corporate mobility in Europe and its impact on different aspects 
of company law has dominated much of the academic writing in European 
company law over the last two decades.1 More recently, forum shopping and 
regulatory arbitrage in corporate insolvency have gained the attention of legal 
commentators, as an increasing number of companies have made use of foreign 
law rescue procedures they considered superior to what was on offer in their 
home legal systems.2 However, debates about the effects of forum shopping have 
not fully appreciated the extent to which all national company law systems depend 
on aspects of adjacent areas of national law in order to achieve the desired 
regulatory outcomes. 
Company law, insolvency law, and to some extent other areas of law such as 
tort, administrative, and criminal law, interact with each other in complex ways to 
form integrated, coherent regulatory systems on the national level. These legal 
areas are functionally interdependent; they have developed in parallel over time as 
jurisdictions have made different choices of how to distribute regulatory tasks 
between them to address similar problems.  
The growing importance of corporate mobility has the potential to tear these 
coherent systems apart. Private international law rules, relying on a range of 
different connecting factors across different legal areas, are tasked with rebuilding 
this regulatory framework across borders, using legal ‘building blocks’ of different 
origin, as companies establish connections with various jurisdictions. In doing so, 
they may, however, fail in three distinct ways. First, inconsistencies in the 
application of private international law rules may fail to create a complete regulatory 
                                                     
1 J Armour, ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’ (2005) 
58 Current Legal Problems 369; L Enriques and M Gelter, ‘Regulatory Competition in European Company 
Law and Creditor Protection’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 417; M Gelter, ‘The 
Structure of Regulatory Competition in European Corporate Law’ (2005) 5 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
247; L Hornuf, Regulatory Competition in European Corporate and Capital Markets Law (Cambridge, Intersentia, 
2012); C Timmermans, ‘Impact of EU Law on International Company Law’ (2010) 18 European Review of 
Private Law 549; C Kirchner, RW Painter, and WA Kaal, ‘Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law 
after Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware’s Product for Europe’ (2005) 2 European Company and Financial 
Law 159. 
2 JA McCahery, ‘Creditor Protection in a Cross-Border Context’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization 
Law Review 455; G McCormack, ‘Jurisdictional Competition and Forum Shopping in Insolvency 
Proceedings’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 169; H Eidenmüller, ‘Free Choice in International Company 
Insolvency Law in Europe’ (2005) 6 European Business Organization Law Review 423; M Menjucq, ‘Towards 
the End of the Real Seat Theory in Europe?’ in: M Tison and others (eds), Perspectives in Company Law and 
Financial Regulation - Essays in Honour of Eddy Wymeersch (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 124; WG 
Ringe, ‘Forum Shopping under the EU Insolvency Regulation’ (2008) 9 European Business Organization Law 
Review 579; WG Ringe, ‘Strategic Insolvency Migration and Community Law’, in WG Ringe, L Gullifer, 
and P Théry (eds), Current Issues in European Financial and Insolvency Law (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
Hart, 2009), 71. The issue has also received much attention in the US under the rubric of forum 
shopping. Bankruptcy law is federal law, but it may be interpreted and applied differently by the courts, 
with potentially important implications for the outcome of the case, see LM LoPucki and WC Whitford, 
‘Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held 
Companies’ (1991) Wisconsin Law Review 11. 
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framework. Certain rules or types of rules are disapplied in their entirety, resulting 
in regulatory gaps as some of the building blocks are not made available despite 
their existence in each of the national legal systems involved. Second, such 
inconsistencies may lead to the application of multiple and sometimes conflicting 
rules of the same type, thus rendering movement across frontiers more costly for 
companies. Third, and perhaps most importantly, completeness and lack of 
overlap are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the coherence of a regulatory 
system. This last point goes beyond the problems created by conflicting or ill-
coordinated private international law rules. The efficacy of regulatory strategies 
depends on various legal and non-legal determinants, for example of a cultural or 
institutional nature. The nature and quality of these determinants will have played 
a pivotal role in how the distribution of regulatory tasks across different legal areas 
evolved over time, and legal systems will thus place different emphasis on the 
strategies at their disposal in regulating a common conflict. As the strategies are 
dissected and re-assembled across borders, the resulting regulatory framework may 
be complete in the sense that each inapplicable strategy of state A is replaced by a 
functional substitute of state B, but it may nevertheless fail to regulate the social 
conflict effectively. We observe this problem in various constellations, pointing to 
a fundamental design flaw in the way we deal with the increasingly international 
reach of domestic companies. 
This paper examines these problems by analysing an area where functional 
interdependence is especially pronounced and which, accordingly, seems well-
suited to highlight the practical relevance of the problems. We focus on the 
regulatory framework in relation to companies in the ‘vicinity of insolvency’ and 
show how conflict of law rules and the territorial reach of administrative and 
criminal mechanisms give rise to substantial frictions in cross-border situations. 
We explore how these frictions create legal uncertainty and result in incoherent 
regulatory solutions, and we investigate the impact this may have on the efficient 
functioning of debt markets. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section B will provide an overview of the 
legal framework for corporate mobility in Europe and the theoretical justification 
for mutual recognition of foreign-incorporated companies. In Section C, we will 
examine a number of legal strategies used in Europe to address the economic 
problems that arise in relation to companies in the vicinity of insolvency and 
analyse their international scope of application. Section D will focus on how 
corporate mobility and conflict of law rules may result in the application of 
incoherent, incomplete, and often inefficient rules to companies making use of 
their Treaty freedoms. Section E contains a number of possible solutions to the 
problems identified in Section D as well as our tentative conclusions. 
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B. CORPORATE MOBILITY, MUTUAL RECOGNITION, AND 
REGULATORY ARBITRAGE 
 
1. CORPORATE MOBILITY IN EUROPE 
 
As we will explain in more detail below, the problems addressed in this paper are 
for the most part direct consequences of the exercise by companies of the 
freedom of establishment enshrined in the Treaty, and the resulting concurrent 
application of different national rules across a number of legal areas. Before 
analysing these problems, it thus seems useful to briefly review the regulatory 
framework governing corporate mobility in the EU.  
Corporate mobility has rightly been described as the ‘very essence of the internal 
market’3 as far as company law is concerned, and it clearly lies at the heart of 
European company law. The way corporate mobility has developed in Europe 
goes hand-in-hand with choice of law: by granting corporations the right to engage 
in cross-border business operations – be it through branches or otherwise – the 
Member States have undoubtedly accepted an obligation to tolerate the application 
and operation of foreign legal concepts within their national economies. 
The drafters of the Treaty were of course aware of the possible problems this 
‘intrusion’ of foreign companies into the territory of the different Member States 
could create. To resolve these issues – particularly the question of when a 
company formed under the law of one Member State would have to be 
recognised4 – the Treaty envisaged a multilateral convention among the Member 
States.5 Although the Member States agreed on the text of such a convention in 
1968,6 it was never ratified. In 2007, the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty apparently 
felt that such a convention was no longer necessary, and Article 293 TEC has now 
been repealed.7  
The perceived redundancy of the multilateral convention envisaged by Article 
293 TEC can easily be traced back to developments in the ECJ’s jurisprudence 
over the last decade or so. In a number of landmark decisions the Court clarified 
                                                     
3 KJ Hopt, ‘The European Company Law Action Plan: An Introduction’ in: KJ Hopt and K Geens (eds), 
The European Company Law Action Plan Revisited (Leuven, Leuven University Press 2010), 18. 
4 We use the term recognition to refer to a situation where the host Member State’s legal system (i) treats 
the company in question as a legal entity, thereby accepting the legal status granted under the law of its 
formation, and (ii) where it accepts that the core arrangements of internal governance are also to be 
determined under that law. 
5 See Article 293 TEC (ex Article 220 EEC) stated that ‘Member States shall, in so far as necessary, engage in 
negotiations with each other with a view to ensuring for the benefit of their nationals […] the mutual recognition of 
companies within the meaning of [what is now Art 54(2) TFEU], the maintenance of their legal personality in cases where 
the registered office is transferred from one country to another, and the possibility for companies subject to the municipal law 
of different Member States to form mergers’. 
6 See Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate (signed on 29 
February 1968), Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement No. 2-1969. See J Rickford, ‘Current 
Developments in European Law on the Restructuring of Companies: An Introduction’ (2004) 15 
European Business Law Review 1225, 1236. 
7 See Treaty of Lisbon (2007), OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, Article 2 (280). 
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the most important issues regarding company recognition. It overwhelmingly did 
so in favour of corporate mobility. While in its Daily Mail decision8 the Court still 
seemed to attach significance to the fact that no convention had been concluded 
between Member States to address problems of corporate mobility,9 this was no 
longer seen as relevant by the Court in subsequent cases. Beginning with Centros,10 
the Court has developed what can be described as essentially a mutual recognition 
approach for EU-incorporated companies, based directly on Articles 49 and 54 
TFEU. In Überseering11 the Court expressly clarified that the exercise of the 
freedom of establishment does indeed not depend on any additional agreement 
among Member States, and in particular that the Treaty in envisaging a convention 
did not create a ‘reserved area’ for national legislation outside the Court’s 
scrutiny.12 Thus, effectively, the Court ruled that the Treaty contains a very broad 
mandate to ‘tolerate’ companies formed under foreign law operating within their 
territory, and in doing so made clear that restrictive national conflicts of law rules 
will have to be disapplied unless justified. 
Importantly, the Court also made clear that this ‘tolerance’ towards foreign-
incorporated entities (i.e. the obligation to recognise them as such) does not depend 
in any way on them carrying out any business activity in their countries of 
formation.13 The Court held that choice of the company law that an incorporator 
considers to be the most advantageous is ‘inherent in the exercise, in a single market, of 
the freedom of establishment’, and that this holds true even where businesses adopt a 
particular structure for the sole reason of becoming subject to their preferred law.14 It 
is widely acknowledged that the line of cases started by Centros opened the door to 
choice of law – and thus regulatory arbitrage – within the EU.15 Rather than 
treating ‘pure’ choice of law (i.e. situations where choice of law is the sole reason for 
                                                     
8 Case 81/87 The Queen v HM Treasury and Commissioners for Inland Revenue, ex p Daily Mail and General Trust 
plc [1988] ECR 5483. 
9 See ibid, para 21-23. Note, however, that the Court in Daily Mail only mentioned the convention in 
relation to the ‘retention of legal personality in the event of transfer of the registered office of companies from one country to 
another’. 
10 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459 at para 27. 
11 Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) [2002] I-9919. 
12 Ibid para 54. See e.g. WF Ebke, ‘The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolution: Überseering, 
Inspire Art and Beyond’ (2004) 38 International Lawyer 813, 824-825; WG Ringe, ‘The European Company 
Statute in the Context of Freedom of Establishment’ (2007) 7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 185, 194; C 
Gerner-Beuerle and M Schillig, ‘The Mysteries of Freedom of Establishment After Cartesio’ (2010) 59 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 303; C Gerner-Beuerle, ‘United in Diversity: Maximum versus 
Minimum Harmonization in EU Securities Regulation’ (2012) 7 Capital Markets Law Journal 317, 338. 
13 By country of incorporation we refer to the jurisdiction under whose laws the company acquired its 
status (i.e. under whose laws it was ‘formed’). 
14 See Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR 
I-10195 at para 121, and Centros (supra n 10), at para 27, where the Court clarifies that such motives 
‘cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment’. 
15 See e.g. Rickford, supra n 6, 1248; Armour, supra n 1; W Bratton, J McCahery, and E Vermeulen, ‘How 
Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A Comparative Analysis’ (2009) 54 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 347; Menjucq, supra n 2, 124; J Armour and WG Ringe, ‘European Company Law 1999-
2010: Renaissance and Crisis’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 125. 
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relying on the Treaty freedoms) as an abuse, the Court made clear that the 
freedom of establishment is (at least also) meant to permit exactly that.16  
Since a significant – and growing – number of Member States do not require 
a ‘factual link’ between their territory and companies formed under its laws,17 
entrepreneurs from across Europe can now choose from among these laws, no 
matter where the majority (or indeed all) of its business activities will take place. In 
other words, Member State cannot require the use of corporations formed under 
its law for business activities in its territory, as long as some Member States allow 
the formation of ‘letter-box companies’.18 
Until relatively recently, however, the resulting choice of law was, in practice, 
primarily of interest for small, newly formed start-up firms, since a number of 
obstacles made re-incorporation difficult for established firms.19 Due to their 
structure,20 newly established companies do not usually have a particular demand 
for highly sophisticated company law solutions, and consequently choice of law 
was mainly driven by factors such as minimum capital requirements, basic 
formation costs, and the speediness of the incorporation process.21 This does not 
mean, however, that the Centros line of cases has been irrelevant for larger, 
established undertakings: it significantly increased the flexibility of corporate 
groups with regard to their legal structure, as it also protected the status of local 
subsidiaries irrespective of the location of their effective management,22 and 
moreover had implications for corporate taxation. The importance of the 
Establishment chapter for larger, established businesses is likely to further increase 
as a consequence of developments in both the case law and EU secondary law. 
First, the Court of Justice has now made it clear that the freedom of establishment 
also confers on established firms a right to change the law that governs its internal 
                                                     
16 See Rickford, ibid at 1248. 
17 Apart from a ‘registered office’, which is little more than a postal address. The term ‘registered office’ is 
thus often being used as being synonymous to the ‘incorporation seat’ in the sense that it highlights the 
jurisdiction under whose laws the company has been formed. See e.g. European Commission, 
Consultation on the cross-border transfers of registered offices of companies (2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/seat-transfer/docs/consultation-
document_en.pdf. 
18 I.e. companies with no business activity and no permanent establishment in the jurisdiction under 
whose law they are formed, such that the only connection with their incorporation jurisdiction consists of 
their business address (registered office). See e.g. M Garcia-Riestra, ‘The Transfer of Seat of the 
European Company v Free Establishment Case-Law’ (2004) 15 European Business Law Review 1295, 1300; 
Rickford, supra n 6. 
19 See e.g. Armour, supra n 1; Bratton and others, supra n 15.  
20 Especially shareholder structure; most start-ups will have only few shareholders. 
21 See e.g. W-G Ringe, ‘Corporate Mobility in the European Union – a Flash in the Pan? An Empirical 
Study on the Success of Lawmaking and Regulatory Competition’ (2013) 10 European Company and 
Financial Law Review 230; Bratton and others (supra n 15), 348; Armour, supra n 1, 385; L Enriques, ‘EC 
Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?’ (2006) 27 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Economic Law 1. 
22 I.e. as long as the state of incorporation does not restrict the choice of the corporate headquarters; see 
Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt. [2008] ECR I-9641. 
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organisation by either merging with companies incorporated abroad23 or by re-
incorporating in another jurisdiction24 with legal continuity. Moreover, both the 
European Company Statute25 and the Cross-Border Merger Directive26 increase 
the ease with which companies can subject themselves to another Member State’s 
law, albeit in the former case only if the process coincides with a physical 
relocation of the company’s headquarters.27 Recently, the European Commission 
has revived the 14th Directive28 on the reincorporation of existing companies – a 
project it had abandoned in 200729 – after the European Parliament requested that 
issue to be addressed by a Directive because it considered the case law on this 
matter to have left open too many questions.30 
Taken together, the developments described above are likely to profoundly 
change the European corporate landscape over the coming years. A number of 
pathways make choice of company law rules available to both entrepreneurs 
(incorporators) and established firms throughout the EU, which adds 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage – the ability to subject the same economic 
structure to one of a variety of different sets of legal rules, each with its benefits 
and costs, in order to reduce costs or increase profits by benefitting from the most 
(privately) advantageous regulatory treatment without changing the economic 
substance of the transaction.31  
It is not our aim to assess the costs and benefits of regulatory arbitrage in 
European company law. Much has been said about how regulatory arbitrage in 
company law may affect the European corporate landscape, the likelihood of the 
                                                     
23 C-411/03 SEVIC Sytems AG v Amtsgericht Neuwied [2005] ECR I-10805. While the Court made it clear 
in SEVIC that cross-border mergers fall under the Treaty freedoms and thus have to be made available 
to European firms irrespective of specific or harmonising legislation, many practical questions remained 
open, making this route unfeasible or impracticable for most established companies in the EU; see e.g. 
Hopt (supra n 4), a 18-19. 
24 See Case C-210/06 Cartesio, n 22 above, at para 110-112; Case C-378/10 VALE Építési kft [2012] ECR 
I-0000, decided 12.7.2012. See e.g. JL Hansen, ‘The Vale Decision and the Court’s Case Law on the 
Nationality of Companies’ (2013) 10 European Company and Financial Law Review. 
25 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company 
(SE) OJ L 294/1. See e.g. H Eidenmüller, A Engert, and L Hornuf, ‘Incorporating under European Law: 
The Societas Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law 
Review 1. 
26 Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-
border mergers of limited liability companies, OJ L 310/1. 
27 See Article 8 of the SE Statute (supra n 25). For a discussion of this requirement see Ringe, supra n 12, 
who questions its compatibility with Article 49 TFEU (but see Case C-210/06 Cartesio, n 22 above). 
28 See Pubic Consultation on the cross-border transfers of registered offices of companies, n 17 above. 
29 On this see M Wyckaert and F Jenne, ‘Corporate Mobility’ in K Geens and KJ Hopt (eds), The European 
Company Law Action Plan Revisited: Reassessment of the 2003 Priorities of the European Commission (Leuven, 
Leuven University Press 2011) 298; J Rickford, ‘Free Movement of Capital and Protectionism after 
Volkswagen and Viking Line’ (2009) in M Tison and others (eds), supra n 2, at 62. 
30 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on a 
14th company law directive on the cross-border transfer of company seats, 2011/2046(INI). The 
resolution contains detailed “instructions”, essentially asking the Commission to replicate the 
mechanisms of the Cross-Border Merger Directive (supra n 26). 
31 See for a general definition e.g. F Partnoy, ‘Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage’ 
(1997) 22 Journal of Corporation Law 211, 227; V Fleischer, ‘Regulatory Arbitrage’ (2010) 89 Texas Law 
Review 227, 229.  
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creation of a ‘European Delaware’,32 the possible impact of regulatory arbitrage on 
Member States’ rule-making and regulatory competition,33 as well as the 
relationship between capital and labour,34 the costs and benefits of 
experimentation and specialisation by legislators, the ability of the law-maker to 
accommodate the idiosyncrasies of particular market participants, or the effect 
regulatory competition has on the quality of legal rules. Our aim is much more 
modest. Rather than questioning whether a system of company law choice has or 
will have positive or negative effects as such, we merely want to examine how the 
interaction of legal rules across different areas of law and across different 
jurisdictions may create problems where companies are permitted to choose the 
applicable (company) law. The problems we discuss here are likely to exist in a 
wide variety of circumstances, but the regulation of companies in the vicinity of 
insolvency seems to provide a particularly suitable showcase to draw attention to 
the legal issues at play. 
 
2. MUTUAL RECOGNITION, HOME STATE CONTROL, AND 
HARMONISATION OF COMPANY LAWS 
 
Before delving into the different areas of law affecting a company in the vicinity of 
insolvency, we must examine the theoretical backdrop against which the Court has 
developed its interpretation of the freedom of establishment and its relationship 
with corporate mobility. Clearly the Centros-line of cases35 allocates regulatory 
power between Member States; for the large (and ill-defined) area of company law, 
it does so in favour of the Member State initially granting legal status to a 
corporation, irrespective of ‘economic realities’ – i.e. largely ignoring the nature of 
the factual ties between a company’s business and the national economies of the 
Member States. 
When analysing the implications of EU law for the private international law 
in this area, two issues are worth highlighting. First, company law constitutes the 
legal framework according to which most private economic activity is carried out 
in market economies, and there can thus be little doubt that a clear and predictable 
allocation of rule-making powers between different interested (i.e. affected) Member 
States is an important prerequisite for the functioning of the single market. 
Without an allocation of some sort companies operating across borders would be 
subject to multiple, potentially conflicting and perhaps unpredictable legal 
                                                     
32 E.g. Armour, supra n 1; L Enriques, ‘EC Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware’ (2004]) 
European Business Law Review 1259; S Lombardo, ‘Regulatory Competition in Company Law in the 
European Union after Cartesio’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law Review 627; Bratton and 
others (supra n 15). 
33 E.g. Bratton and others (supra n 15); A Johnston and P Syrpis, ‘Regulatory Competition in European 
Company Law after Cartesio’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 378. 
34 M Gelter, ‘Tilting the Balance between Capital and Labor? The Effects of Regulatory Arbitrage in 
European Corporate Law on Employees’ (2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 792. 
35 See text to n 8-16. 
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obligations. But this does not necessarily assist us in answering which ‘rule-making 
rule’ is likely to create the best outcomes, and there are of course various possible 
candidates. Second, a distinction has to be made between an allocation of rule-
making powers intended to merely avoid costly duplication of regulatory efforts 
on the one hand, and solutions which go further by designating one single 
Member State to decide all matters arising within a particular regulatory space on 
the other hand. 
These two issues are also (loosely) related to the familiar ‘mutual recognition’ 
and ‘home state control’ approaches.36 The former approach, by aiming at 
avoidance of regulatory redundancies, focusses on preventing Member States from 
ignoring the regulatory framework an entity is subject to due to its connection 
with other Member States. The impact of such an approach to defining Member 
States’ regulatory competences is rather limited, as it would suggest that Member 
States are only prevented from enforcing unnecessary rules – i.e. rules the aims of 
which have already been achieved by other means. In other words, a pure mutual 
recognition approach primarily mandates an appreciation of the relevant 
‘regulatory history’ before imposing legal requirements for (in our case) companies 
with cross-border operations.37 Any such approach is of course based on a notion 
of equivalence between the different legal systems involved. A meaningful 
‘duplication’ can only exist where one presumes that the relevant jurisdictions are 
all able and willing to give effect to the rules in question, and only this equivalence 
justifies prioritising one jurisdiction over the other when defining the regulatory 
spaces occupied by different Member States. To be sure, this is not to say that all 
jurisdictions involved are necessarily equally well-suited to address the questions at 
issue. In fact, one would expect that the allocation of regulatory power will be 
informed by a notion of who the best-suited regulator would likely be in a given 
context, although views on this question are bound to differ across Member 
States. The point is, rather, that this approach prevents Member States from 
generally presuming the necessity to substitute or supplement foreign regulatory 
solutions with domestic ones.  
As such an approach aims only at preventing duplication of regulatory 
burdens, it ultimately depends on an acknowledgement that a particular legal 
problem or social conflict is in fact also being addressed by another Member State. 
Absent that, an (exclusive) allocation of regulatory powers cannot be explained by 
a desire to avoid ‘double jeopardy’. Take for example a rule requiring company 
directors to pay due regard to the environmental impact of the company’s 
operations existing in one Member State. To the extent that no other interested 
Member State adopts rules of similar effect, even a wide ‘outreach’ application of 
this rule would not lead to a duplication of the regulatory burden of companies 
subject to the rule. To be sure, the very question of whether or not a particular 
rule results in a relevant duplication of regulatory efforts will often be a 
                                                     
36 See KA Armstrong, ‘Mutual Recognition’ in C Barnard and J Scott (eds), The Law of the Single Market: 
Unpacking the Premises (Oxford, Hart, 2002), 225, especially at 230.  
37 See Armstrong (ibid at 234). 
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controversial one. One may, for instance, take different views on whether the 
application of a duty of company directors to pay due regard to an undertaking’s 
environmental impact in Member State A operates in much the same way as 
concurrently applicable stricter direct environmental protection laws in Member 
State B, or whether minimum capital requirements in Member State A and stricter 
distribution rules in Member State B create a ‘double jeopardy’-situation when 
applied cumulatively. Nevertheless, following the double jeopardy-logic would 
mean that it is the answer to this ‘double jeopardy’-question that determines the 
regulatory reach of the jurisdictions involved. 
Under the alternative approach – pure home state control – regulatory power 
would be directly and exclusively allocated between the ‘interested’ Member States, 
e.g. in favour of the jurisdiction which has first granted market access38 or, in the 
case of companies, the law of the Member State under which the company has 
initially been formed. Unlike the mutual recognition approach, true home state 
control – or a competitive regulatory model39 – reaches beyond the problem of 
duplicity of regulatory compliance. Instead of only seeking to avoid a situation 
where EU nationals are burdened by multiple different regulatory requirements 
that all pursue a common policy goal, home state control also, in principle, covers 
situations where Member States disagree on these very policy goals, rather than 
just the best path to achieve them. 
Both approaches cannot be viewed in isolation from the harmonisation of 
laws, and particularly so in the area of company law. First, both approaches can 
operate as alternatives to the harmonisation of laws. 40 Rather than harmonising 
regulatory requirements, cross-border activity can be facilitated within a fairly 
diverse regulatory environment, provided that compliance with the legal 
requirements of one (i.e. the home state) system replaces the requirements to 
comply with similar rules of another (i.e. the host state) legal system. Second, the 
relevance of mutual recognition depends on equivalence and similarity of the 
relevant legal frameworks: Where legal systems differ too much, a strategy of the 
mutual recognition type would likely fail to lower the cost of cross-border activity 
simply because the home state requirements that have been complied with do not 
address the same issues as the rules of the host state legal order, which means that 
engaging in cross-border activity increases the regulatory burden, even if the 
additional rules do not duplicate the already existing requirements of the home 
jurisdiction, as can be seen in our example above. Thus, the approach we labelled 
‘mutual recognition’ is likely to be of little use in practice for facilitating cross-
border economic activity unless a certain level of harmonisation of substantive 
laws (or at least close alignment of policy goals) exists.41 The home state control-
                                                     
38 See ibid at 228. 
39 MP Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Oxford, 
Hart, 1998) 126. 
40 See Armstrong, supra n 36, 225-226. 
41 ibid. 
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approach is linked even more intimately with the harmonisation of national laws, 
or more precisely with the equivalence of such laws.42 By accepting the exclusive 
application of home rules in cross-border situations, the host state effectively signs 
away its ability to regulate economic activity within its borders, as it necessarily 
results in economic actors only complying with one set of rules, even where the 
parallel application of different sets of rules would not result in an unnecessary 
accumulation of regulatory requirements. Thus, host states – and every Member 
State is of course also a host state in relation to some economic actors – will 
typically accept a system of home state control only where the substantive rules 
across the different jurisdictions are ‘similar enough’, i.e. where the scope for 
regulatory arbitrage is diminished by the equivalence of the different sets of 
rules.43  
How can we best categorise the approach taken by the Court of Justice in 
relation to corporate mobility and choice of law? This question cannot yet be 
answered with certainty, and as will be shown below, Member States seem to take 
different views on it. Where exactly would the differences lie between a home state 
control and a mutual recognition model in the area of company law? Clearly, both 
approaches would result in the home state (i.e. the incorporation jurisdiction) 
retaining most of the regulatory power over company law, with limited scope for 
host state control – a result we know to be right in practice based on the 
jurisprudence of the European Court.  
Viewed through the lens of a mutual recognition model, the allocation of 
regulatory power to the home state would follow from the fact that, naturally, 
both jurisdictions have to address the same types of problems and social conflicts, 
such that compliance with both jurisdictions’ legal requirements would necessarily 
involve a costly duplication of regulatory requirements. A pure home state 
approach would lead to the same result without the intermediate step of testing 
whether the two jurisdictions indeed address the same problems through their 
laws. However, where the host state addresses a policy area (say, environmental 
policy) at least in part through company law rules,44 while the state of incorporation 
employs a different, non-company law technique (e.g. emission trading), what we 
call the mutual recognition model would suggest that the host state’s power to 
regulate is unaffected: an ‘outreach’ application of the domestic rules to all 
companies operating within its territory would not lead to a duplication of 
regulation. A home state control view, on the other hand, would suggest that the 
power to regulate company law as such is allocated to the home state, and that 
perceived ‘gaps’ in that law – such as the absence of environmental considerations 
in directors’ duties regulation – is irrelevant.  
                                                     
42 It is of course the equivalence or similarity of laws that ultimately matters here, but equivalence will 
typically require harmonisation in most areas of the law. 
43 See on the link between this and the concept of maximum harmonisation Gerner-Beuerle, supra n 12. 
44 E.g. by defining directors’ duties with reference to environmental impact. 
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None of the Centros-line cases45 provides a clear answer as to the underlying 
model. Inspire Art46 may be the most informative case in that it concerned a clear 
outreach-type statute: Dutch rules applicable to certain foreign-incorporated 
entities ‘intruded’ into and interfered with the status-providing home state law 
(UK law), and the Court held this intrusion to be a (non-justifiable) restriction. 
However, in that case Dutch law purported to do so in order to protect creditors – 
a concern undoubtedly shared by the UK company law legislator. Thus, the 
outcome of Inspire Art– and the remaining Centros-line cases – can be explained 
under both models here presented. Nevertheless, the Court’s reasoning, as well as 
the absence of any meaningful examination of functional equivalence between 
home and host state rules in the case law, suggests that it indeed is a home state 
control model that the Court has developed.  
There is at least one important case in which the ‘underlying model’-question 
would be highly relevant: board-level employee participation. Except following a 
cross-border merger or an SE-formation, employee participation rules are 
currently applied on an incorporation basis only, and no significant attempt has 
been made to our knowledge by any Member State to apply its employee 
participation rules to foreign-incorporated companies. But what if, say, Germany 
adopted such a law, for instance mandating employee representatives on boards of 
foreign companies with significant (or exclusively) German operations? It is 
submitted that an assessment of such a (hypothetical) rule would differ depending 
on the underlying model, being permissible under a mutual recognition view, but 
in need of Gebhard-justification47 under a home state control model. The latter 
outcome, arguably, seems more likely.  
It is also worth pointing out that both models are necessarily based on 
implicit ‘presumptions of equivalence’,48 although these presumptions differ somewhat 
depending on the fundament one suspects beneath the Court’s case law. Most 
obviously, a home state control approach must be based on the presumption that 
the Member State allocated with regulatory power in a particular area of law will 
be willing and able to create a legal framework that is, in general terms, acceptable to 
other Member States. But even a mutual recognition model must be predicated on 
the presumption of broad equivalence regarding the efficacy of the legal systems 
involved, which justifies that broad, indistinctly applicable host state measures 
duplicating home state requirements constitute a prima facie breach.49 The implied 
                                                     
45 supra n 10. 
46 supra n 14. 
47 See Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, 
which requires restrictions to be non-discriminatory, suitable to achieve an overriding public interest 
objective, proportionate, and not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective in question. 
48 See on the link to mutual recognition, e.g., C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU : The Four Freedoms 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2007) 111; see also A Rosas, ‘Life after Dassonville and Cassis: 
Evolution but no Revolution’ in MP Maduro and L Azoulai (eds) The Past and Future of EU law: The 
Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford, Hart, 2010), 433, 440. 
49 See e.g. Centros (supra n 10). 
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presumptions of equivalence are of course an expression of the set of common 
principles across Member States, and perhaps ultimately an expectation that 
Member States have an interest in creating appropriate national company law 
systems that avoid externalities, which explains the high bar set by the Gebhard test. 
Company law is in some ways ‘special’: its rules are necessarily highly 
interlinked and interdependent, and they do not lend themselves easily to be 
selectively replaced by ‘foreign law’. In fact, the two competing conflict of laws 
approaches, the real seat and the incorporation doctrine, have in common that 
they both aim at leaving intact what is generally a coherent set of interwoven 
rules.50 The incorporation doctrine achieves this, in principle, by applying the 
home state legal system in relation to most questions of company law, no matter 
how closely connected a company is to another jurisdiction.51 The real seat 
doctrine, on the other hand, ‘leaves intact’ the home state legal system – i.e. 
accepts that the foreign company will be governed by home state law – but does 
so only up to a certain point – typically the point is where the centre of 
management and control is located in the jurisdiction applying the real seat 
doctrine. Where the intensity of connection with the real seat state exceeds this 
trigger, the real seat jurisdiction will then apply its entire company law to the foreign 
entity. In both cases, the combination of company laws and the relevant conflict 
of laws rules ensure that companies are subject to a coherent, compatible and 
typically well thought-through legal framework in relation to most aspects of their 
internal organisation, including their relationship with investors. The special status 
of company law, and the “one law”-result achieved by both of the traditional 
approaches to allocate rule-making powers across Member States in company law 
matters, may also support a home state control-approach view of the Court’s case 
law. 
Problems do arise, however, whenever company law rules interact with other 
areas of law or with the institutional framework offered by a particular 
                                                     
50 The aim to agree on a private international law framework for companies which not only achieves 
consistent results across jurisdictions, but which also renders only one national law applicable to all aspects of 
a company’s life has been an integral part of the international efforts in this field; see e.g. the ILA Draft 
Convention on Conflicts of Law relating to Companies, International Company Law Report (1958) 48 Int’l L. 
Ass’n Rep. Conf. 629, 645 (Art 3 and 4). This question has also been raised in the US, where corporate law 
is a matter of State regulation; the Supreme Court has emphasised the importance of a ‘single law’ 
solution (see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 645: ‘the internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which 
recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs — matters 
peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders — because 
otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands’ (emphases added)). Similarly, the Delaware 
Supreme Court in VantagePoint (VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 
2005)) refused to apply a Californian law purporting to regulate the internal affairs of certain Delaware 
corporations; see C Allmendinger, ‘Company Law in the European Union and the United States: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Impact of the EU Freedoms of Establishment and Capital and the U.S. 
Interstate Commerce Clause’ (2013) 4 William & Mary Business Law Review 67, 83. See also P Kindler, 
‘Internationales Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht’, in FJ Säckerand and R Rixecker (eds), Münchener 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (Munich, CH Beck, 5th edn, 2010, Vol 11), at 321, emphasising the 
fact that functional interdependence of company law rules necessitates the applicability of one single law. 
51 See on the two different theories e.g. Menjucq, supra n 2; Armour and Ringe, supra n 15. 
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jurisdiction.52 This can be true throughout the life of a company, of course: capital 
maintenance rules may interact with accounting regulation; company law may 
implicitly or explicitly rely on the existence of notaries to afford protection to 
shareholders and third parties; the liability of company directors may depend on 
their status under the applicable labour law; the exercise of voting rights may be 
restrained by concepts of general civil law. Accordingly, the operation of company 
law may change once the company ‘leaves’ its home jurisdiction – at least to the 
extent that by doing so, it severs the connection between the company law it is 
subject to and the rules that interact – and were meant to interact – with it.  
One situation where ‘inter-doctrinal’ interaction becomes particularly 
important, it is submitted, is where a company approaches insolvency. While, as 
we shall see, all Member States implement legal strategies to address the various 
problems connected to this stage of a company’s life, the legal techniques used 
differ widely. More importantly, these legal strategies are ‘located’ in areas of law 
the application of which depends on connecting factors different from what 
determines the application of the company law rules they interact with. 
 
 
 
C. FUNCTIONALITY AND INTERNATIONAL SCOPE OF 
CREDITOR PROTECTION LAW 
 
1. LEGAL STRATEGIES TO PROTECT CREDITORS IN THE VICINITY OF 
INSOLVENCY 
 
As a company nears insolvency and the equity capital evaporates, perverse 
incentives are created for shareholders and directors alike.53 Creditors, rather than 
shareholders are now rightly to be seen as residual claimants.54 At this point, 
shareholders (and directors) have privately optimal risk-levels for the company’s 
business operation that would render it inefficient to leave them ‘in charge’ 
without regulatory intervention.55 Virtually all legal systems have developed 
strategies to address this problem and to avoid inefficient risk-shifting in the 
vicinity, or upon occurrence, of insolvency.  
                                                     
52 This is of course the very problem discussed in relation to all ‘legal transplants’; see infra Section D.2. 
The problem can even arise within a given jurisdiction; see e.g. E Rock and M Wachter, ‘Dangerous 
Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants’ 96 Northwestern University Law 
Review 651. 
53 See e.g. PL Davies, ‘Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in 
the Vicinity of Insolvency’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 301; H Eidenmüller, 
‘Trading in Times of Crisis: Formal Insolvency Proceedings, Workouts and the Incentives for 
Shareholders/Managers’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 239; T Bachner, ‘Wrongful 
Trading – A New European Model for Creditor Protection?’ (2004) 5 European Business Organization Law 
Review 293. 
54 Davies, ibid at 324. 
55 See the detailed analysis by Eidenmüller, supra n 53. 
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In the EU, the main strategies are: (1) a duty of the company directors to file 
for the opening of insolvency proceedings; (2) liability of the directors for 
wrongful trading, i.e. the continuation of trading even though ‘there was no 
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent 
liquidation’;56 (3) a change of directors’ fiduciary duties; and (4) the duty to call a 
general meeting and either recapitalise or liquidate the company. These strategies 
are supplemented by general principles of company law or civil and commercial 
law. The general duties of directors continue to apply in the vicinity of insolvency. 
For example, directors may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care by 
managing the company imprudently and thus causing or aggravating the 
company’s insolvency. Some jurisdictions take recourse to tort law to hold 
directors responsible for a loss suffered by the creditors. Finally, in addition to 
civil liability, administrative and/or criminal sanctions apply to directors who fail 
to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings in violation of legal requirements 
or display other types of misconduct. An important administrative sanction is the 
disqualification of directors, which may be ordered by the bankruptcy court if the 
director has been convicted of a crime and, depending on the jurisdiction, if the 
director has materially violated legal obligations or is ‘unfit to be concerned in the 
management of a company’.57 
The following table gives an overview of the distribution of the four main 
strategies in the EU and, for purposes of comparison, the US.58 
 
Table 1. Legal strategies in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
Country Duty to file or 
wrongful trading 
Change of 
duties 
Convene or 
recapitalise 
Austria duty to file no convene GM 
Belgium duty to file no convene GM 
Bulgaria duty to file no recapitalise 
Croatia duty to file no convene GM 
Cyprus wrongful trading yes convene GM 
Czech Republic duty to file no recapitalise 
Denmark hybrid approach 
(both)59 
yes convene GM 
                                                     
56 UK Insolvency Act 1986, s 214(2)(b). 
57 Irish Companies Act 1990, s. 160(2)(d); UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, ss. 6(1), 
8(2). 
58 Adapted from C Gerner-Beuerle, P Paech, and EP Schuster, ‘Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability’ 
(2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/board/2013-study-
analysis_en.pdf. Note that not all strategies apply equally to private limited companies. 
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Country Duty to file or 
wrongful trading 
Change of 
duties 
Convene or 
recapitalise 
Estonia duty to file yes recapitalise 
Finland duty to file no convene GM 
France duty to file no recapitalise 
Germany duty to file no convene GM 
Greece duty to file no convene GM 
Hungary duty to file yes convene GM 
Ireland wrongful trading yes convene GM 
Italy duty to file no recapitalise 
Latvia duty to file yes recapitalise 
Lithuania duty to file no recapitalise 
Luxembourg duty to file no recapitalise 
Malta duty to file yes convene GM 
Netherlands wrongful trading 
prohibition 
no convene GM 
Poland duty to file no convene GM 
Portugal duty to file no recapitalise 
Romania wrongful trading no convene GM 
Slovakia duty to file no convene GM 
Slovenia duty to file no convene GM 
Spain duty to file no recapitalise 
Sweden duty to file no recapitalise 
United 
Kingdom 
wrongful trading yes convene GM 
United States deepening 
insolvency60 
ambivalent61 No duty to 
convene or  
                                                                                                                                       
59 Case law has established a rule similar to the UK wrongful trading prohibition. Directors who know (or 
should have known) that the company has no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvency must minimise 
the potential losses to creditors or will be liable. In addition, a duty to file for insolvency also applies. 
60 The tort of deepening insolvency goes back to Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 
(3d Cir. 2001) (applying Pennsylvania law). However, it is not recognised as a separate cause of action in 
Delaware and does not give rise to a duty to liquidate, see Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & 
Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del Ch. 2006). Instead, deepening insolvency claims may be integrated into 
the general framework of directors’ duties, In re The Brown Schools, 386 B.R. 37, 46-47 (Bankr. D. Del. 
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As is evident from Table 1, the majority of member states provide for a duty on 
the part of a company’s directors to timely file for insolvency. Typically, this 
strategy is then buttressed by a consequential liability of directors for any depletion 
of the company’s assets resulting from the delayed insolvency filing. In most 
Member States employing this strategy, this liability can only be enforced by the 
liquidator and thus results in a proportional satisfaction of all creditors’ claims. 
The second main strategy is very similar in nature. Instead of setting a legal 
requirement for the insolvency filing, a jurisdiction may require directors to cease 
trading at a particular point in time. 
The filing strategy is more widely spread. It is necessarily triggered by the 
insolvency of the company (however defined by national law), rather than merely a 
threat of insolvency. The ‘wrongful trading’ strategy will sometimes be triggered 
only after the company has reached a state of formal balance sheet insolvency,62 
but may also be triggered before the company is formally insolvent, as it is based 
on an assessment of the company’s financial prospects. Thus, directors of a 
formally insolvent company that has a realistic chance to trade its way out of its 
situation may be justified in continuing the business, while directors in a not-yet 
insolvent company may be obliged to cease its operations where the avoidance of 
a (future) insolvency seems highly unlikely. Of course, jurisdictions following the 
‘duty to file’-strategy will also often allow the continuation of trading beyond the 
point where the company is balance-sheet insolvent,63 but they will do so by adjusting the 
definition of the insolvency grounds, rather than by adjusting the duty to file itself. 
In addition, in some Member States the definition or the scope of directors’ 
duties changes as the company approaches insolvency, particularly by moving 
from a shareholder-centric towards a more creditor-regarding set of objectives,64 
or by changes in the general standard of care.65  
An additional regulatory strategy that at least indirectly addresses the problems 
posed by companies in the vicinity of insolvency is the so-called “re-capitalise or 
liquidate” rule. Throughout the EU, public companies are obliged to call a general 
meeting where the (cumulated) losses of a company exceed 50% of the subscribed 
capital.66 While the Second Directive requires the calling of a general meeting in 
                                                                                                                                       
2008). For a discussion see CW Frost, Corporate Governance in insolvency and Bankruptcy (San Francisco, 
LexisNexis, 2011), § 3[4]. 
61 Delaware courts initially allowed the directors to rely on the interests of the creditors as a ‘shield’ in 
order to rebut a breach of duty claim brought by the shareholders, Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. 
Pathe Communications Corporation, 1991 W.L. 277613 (Del. Ch.). In recent decisions, the Delaware courts, 
however, emphasised that the content of the duties of directors and the constituencies to whom they are 
owed do not fundamentally change in the vicinity of insolvency. See, for example, North American Catholic 
Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. Supr. 2007) (holding that ‘in the 
zone of insolvency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to 
discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business 
judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners’. Ibid, 101). 
62 See e.g. Davies, supra n 53, 311; Bachner, supra n 53. 
63 See the comparison of German and English law by Bachner, supra n 53. 
64 See e.g. Davies, supra n 53, at 327-329. 
65 This seems to be the case in relation to Denmark. 
66 See Art 17 of the Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976, OJ L 26/1. 
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these circumstances, it does not actually require companies to take any specific 
action. In so far as Art 17 of the Second Directive only requires a meeting of the 
shareholders, the rule does not seem to follow a clear economic rationale. First, 
the reference to the subscribed capital is, in itself, not a meaningful triggering 
event. The registered share capital will not be a particularly useful reference point, 
as this figure says virtually nothing about the assets or capital needs of a 
company.67 Second, even (or particularly) where the event of losses amounting to 
more than 50% of the registered share capital is a significant point in time in the 
company’s life, it is at the very least questionable whether this is the right time to 
put shareholders in the driver’s seat given the perverse incentives that exist at this 
point.68 In fact, to the extent that this event coincides with the company becoming 
significantly undercapitalised, shareholders’ incentives are distorted, since limited 
liability will often mean that an increase in the company’s risk profile also leads to 
an increase in the value of their shares. 
While a majority of the Member States have implemented Art 17 of the 
Second Directive as a mere duty to call a meeting, some go beyond this minimum 
requirement. These Member States require companies to choose, upon a loss of 
half of their subscribed share capital, between either re-capitalising the company 
or winding down its operations and liquidating the company. The effect of the ‘re-
capitalise or liquidate’ rule on near-insolvency trading is twofold. First, it aims at 
making it less likely for companies to trade in a state of capital depletion, at least 
where the nominal share capital is indeed a significant figure. Second, duty-related 
enforcement mechanisms are directly linked to this strategy, as failure to ensure 
that appropriate capital measures are taken at this very early stage typically leads to 
the liability of the directors. In fact, it may well be the case that it is the relative 
ease with which non-compliance with this rule can be proven, as compared to e.g. 
incompetent management or foreseeability of insolvency, which makes this 
strategy attractive despite the arbitrary nature of its trigger. 
 
2. EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
 
The principle of home state control, as we understand it here, attempts to avoid 
friction between legal systems and the imposition of double burdens on market 
participants that engage in cross-border economic activity by allocating 
comprehensive regulatory authority to one Member State, the home state. 
However, whether a social conflict is comprehensively regulated by one legal 
system depends not only on the existence of a rule, usually stemming from 
European law, that performs this allocative function unambiguously and to the 
exclusion of regulatory action by other Member States, but also on the coherence 
                                                     
67 See J Rickford, ‘Reforming Capital: Report of the Interdisciplinary Group on Capital Maintenance’ 
(2004) 15 European Business Law Review 919; J Armour, ‘Legal Capital: an Outdated Concept?’ (2006) 7 
European Business Organization Law Review 5. 
68 See Davies, supra n 53. 
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of the home state’s legal system. In domestic situations, a legal system is 
necessarily coherent in that the solution to the social conflict will be derived from 
the body of rules constituting the legal system. In cross-border situations, on the 
other hand, the home state’s private international law determines whether, and if 
yes, which parts of the home state’s substantive law are applicable to the case at 
hand. Thus, the goal of home state control may be undermined by a dissection of 
regulatory authority at the second stage of the investigation, with potentially 
detrimental consequences for mobility within the single market. 
The conflict rules that determine the law applicable to European companies 
with cross-border operations are partly harmonised and contained in a number of 
EU regulations, and partly derive from national law. The most likely sources of the 
legal strategies discussed above that are employed to address disputes in the 
vicinity of insolvency are a country’s insolvency law, company law, and tort law. 
We will examine the conflict rules in these areas in turn in order to sketch the 
private international law framework that governs vicinity of insolvency situations 
and assess the extent to which it leads, in appropriate situations, to a dissection of 
regulatory authority. 
 
Insolvency law 
 
The rules on jurisdiction for opening insolvency proceedings, recognition of 
judgments delivered on the basis of such proceedings, and the applicable law have 
been unified by the EU Insolvency Regulation.69 The main connecting factor, both 
for jurisdiction and applicable law, is the centre of a debtor’s main interest 
(COMI). The courts of the Member State in whose territory the COMI is located 
have international jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings.70 COMI is a rather 
ambiguous criterion that has given rise to a substantial body of case law and 
received much attention in the academic literature.71 It is not necessary to review 
the debate in this article; a brief description of the concept shall suffice. According 
to the Regulation, the centre of main interest corresponds ‘to the place where the 
debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis’,72 which has 
been interpreted by national courts as referring to the place where the ‘head office 
functions’ of the company are performed.73 In the case of a legal person, COMI is 
presumed to be at the place where the person’s registered office is located.74 The 
presumption can be rebutted ‘if factors which are both objective and ascertainable 
by third parties enable it to be established that an actual situation exists which is 
                                                     
69 Council regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L160/1. 
70 Insolvency Regulation, art 3(1). 
71 For a detailed discussion with references see G Moss, IF Fletcher, and S Isaacs (eds), The EC Regulation 
on Insolvency Proceedings (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2009), 3.11-3.15, 8.72-8.99. The leading 
decision of the Court of Justice is Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd. [2006] ECR I-3813. 
72 Insolvency Regulation, Recital 13. The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, COM(2012) 
744 final, moves the definition of the COMI from the recitals to the main text, see art 3(1), as amended.  
73 For a discussion of the case law see Moss et al, supra n 71, 8.81-8.87. 
74 Insolvency Regulation, art 3(1). 
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different from [the presumption]’,75 in particular where the company does not 
carry out any business activities in the incorporation state.76 Thus, the connecting 
factor under the Insolvency Regulation incorporates both elements of the 
incorporation theory and the real seat theory in private international company law. 
COMI, at least as understood by the ‘head office functions’ test, corresponds 
largely to the siège reel of the company.77 Given that the ‘head office functions’ test 
is relevant (albeit not sufficient) for a rebuttal of the presumption and that it is 
conclusive where the management functions of the company are performed in the 
place of registration,78 it is justified to argue that the Insolvency Regulation is 
predominantly drafted in the spirit of the real seat theory.79 
The reach of the Insolvency Regulation is almost as controversial as the 
meaning of COMI. One of the objectives of the Insolvency Regulation is the 
reduction of forum shopping by financially distressed and insolvent firms.80 The 
Regulation aims to achieve this goal not only by defining COMI so as to render it 
resistant to manipulation, but also by providing for a clear delimitation of the 
reach of COMI as a connecting factor to avoid regulatory gaps (or the 
accumulation of legal rules). However, as will be shown below, for two reasons it 
is questionable whether the Regulation meets this objective. First, the provisions 
that determine the scope of the Regulation are ambivalent, and second, the 
boundaries of private international insolvency law are drawn by the Regulation in a 
formalistic way that does not appreciate the underlying social conflicts. 
COMI determines jurisdiction for the collective insolvency proceedings listed 
in Annex A to the Regulation,81 as well as ‘actions which derive directly from 
those proceedings and which are closely connected to them’.82 The Court of 
Justice interprets the latter requirements restrictively. An action is likely to be 
qualified as ‘directly deriving’ from insolvency proceedings and as being ‘closely 
connected’ with them if it requires the opening of insolvency proceedings or the 
                                                     
75 Eurofood, supra n 71, para 34. Under the proposal for an amended Insolvency Regulation, the 
presumption is unrebuttable if ‘the bodies responsible for the management and supervision of a company 
are in the same place as its registered office and the management decisions are taken there in a manner 
ascertainable by third parties’ (codifying Case C-396/09 Interedil Srl, in liquidation v Fallimento Interedil Srl and 
Intesa Gestione Crediti SpA, nyr, para 50). Thus, the ‘head office functions’ test will be the sole factor if the 
registered seat coincides with the place where the head office functions are performed. 
76 Eurofood, supra n 71, para 35.  
77 G McCormack, ‘Reconstructing European Insolvency Law – Putting in Place a New Paradigm’ (2010) 
30 Legal Studies 126, 129. 
78 Interedil, supra n 75, para 50. 
79 IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law: National and International Approaches (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd edn, 2005), 7.42. 
80 Insolvency Regulation, Recital 4. 
81 Insolvency Regulation, arts 1(1), 2(a). 
82 Case C-339/07 Christopher Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV [2009] ECR I-767, para 21 (dealing with an 
avoidance action pursuant to the German Insolvency Code, s 129). This construction of art 3(1) of the 
Insolvency Regulation relies on the case law of the Court of Justice regarding what is now the bankruptcy 
exception in art 1(2)(b) of the EU Judgments Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1), see in particular Case 133/78 Gourdain v Nadler [1979] ECR 733. 
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involvement of a liquidator83 and the action aims at protecting ‘the general body of 
creditors’.84 These conditions were held to be satisfied for avoidance actions,85 
liability for the failure to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings,86 UK 
wrongful or fraudulent trading,87 the French action en comblement de passif, now action 
en responsabilité pour insufissance d’actif,88 and actions regarding shareholder loans 
given, or not called in, when the company nears insolvency,89 but not for claims 
against directors for a breach of duty.90 It should be noted, however, that many 
questions remain controversial in the Member States.91 
The applicable law generally follows the rules on international jurisdiction, i.e. 
the court of the opening of the insolvency proceedings applies the lex fori as lex 
concursus.92 The lex concursus determines the conditions for the opening of the 
proceedings, their conduct, closure, and effects.93 The Regulation specifies the 
content of the general rule by providing for a non-exhaustive list of matters that 
are governed by the lex concursus.94 The list does not include the above-mentioned 
issues, for example the liability of directors for wrongful trading, responsabilité pour 
insufissance d’actif, or responsabilidad concursal.95 However, such issues fall within the 
scope of the Regulation’s general conflict rule if they are closely related to the 
                                                     
83 Case C-292/08 German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v Alice van der Schee [2009] ECR I-8421, para 
32 (holding that the enforcement of a retention of title clause by a creditor against the insolvent company 
falls outside the scope of the Insolvency Regulation because “the mere fact that the liquidator is a party to 
the proceedings is not sufficient to classify the proceedings […]  as […] deriving directly from the 
insolvency and being closely linked to proceedings for realising assets”, para 33). See also the Virgos-
Schmit Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (1996), para 196 (explaining that ‘actions 
that the debtor could have undertaken even without the opening of insolvency proceedings’ should not 
be included, but only actions ‘which are based on (and not only affected by) insolvency law and are only 
possible during the insolvency proceedings or in direct relation with them’). 
84 Deko Marty, supra n 82, para 16. 
85 Ibid. See also Byers v Yacht Bull Corp [2010] EWHC 133 (Ch) (holding that an action to set aside an 
undervalue transaction pursuant to the UK Insolvency Act 1986, s 238, falls within the bankruptcy 
exception of the Judgments Regulation). 
86 See, e.g., LG Kiel [District Court Kiel, Germany], NZG 2006, 672 (classifying the duty to file and 
ensuing liability pursuant to the German Civil Code, s 823(2), and the Stock Corporation Act, s 93(2), as 
insolvency law, and applying the provisions to an English limited company with COMI in Germany). 
87 Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2006] BCC 57, para 42. 
88 Art L.651-2 of the French Commercial Code. See Gourdain, supra n 82. 
89 BGH [German Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 21 July 2011, IX ZR 185/10 (holding that the re-
characterisation of shareholder loans as equity in the vicinity of insolvency should be classified as 
insolvency law, even though the doctrine originated in capital maintenance law (analogy to German 
Limited Liability Companies Act, ss 30, 31, version in force until 31 October 2008, now codified in the 
German Insolvency Code, ss 39, 135)). 
90 Grupo Torras SA v Sheikh Fahad Mohammad Al-Sabah [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 374 (holding that the English 
action for breach of duty ‘does not relate to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal 
persons, judicial arrangements, compositions or analogous proceedings; it is purely collateral that the 
plaintiff is in a state of suspension of payments’, ibid, 400). 
91 See, e.g., H Altmeppen and A Ego, ‘Europäische Niederlassungsfreiheit’, in W Goette and M 
Habersack (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (Munich, CH Beck, 3rd edn, 2012), 389-405 
(reviewing the different opinions and advocating a classification of the duty to file and civil and criminal 
liability for violation of the duty as company law). 
92 Insolvency Regulation, art 4. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid, art 4(2). 
95 Spanish Insolvency Act, art 172bis, as amended by Act 38/2011 of October 10, 2011. 
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insolvency proceedings pursuant to the above principles.96 Thus, as before, the 
directors’ general corporate law duties are not governed by the lex concursus.97 It is 
less clear whether this also holds if the law provides for a discernible shift of the 
duties in the vicinity of insolvency, in the sense that the directors have to act 
primarily in the interest of the creditors, rather than the shareholders.98 The 
guiding principles established by the Court of Justice are ambiguous. In Gourdain, 
the Court held that the liability action at issue (liability for part of the debts of an 
insolvent company pursuant to French law) was to be classified as insolvency law 
because it ‘derogate[d] from the general rules of the law of liability’,99 i.e. here the 
rules on civil liability of directors. This is not true for creditor-regarding duties in 
the vicinity of insolvency, which derive from the general law on directors’ duties. 
While they may predominantly (but not exclusively100) be brought by the liquidator 
and are owed to the body of creditors, not to individual creditors, they operate 
within the framework of the directors’ general duties, and liability follows largely 
the same conditions. Not surprisingly, the literature has expressed some 
uncertainty how to classify them.101 
The proposal for a Regulation amending the Insolvency Regulation does not 
clarify this issue. It explicitly extends the scope of the Regulation to include 
actions closely linked with insolvency proceedings, thus codifying the case law of 
the Court of Justice,102 but does not elaborate on the requirements of ‘closely 
linked with’, and ‘directly deriving from’, the insolvency.103 The proposal also 
stipulates that actions based on general civil and commercial law that are related to 
such closely linked actions and are directed against the same defendant may be 
brought by the liquidator in the courts of the Member States where the defendant 
is domiciled.104 Thus, upon the election of the liquidator, liability claims under 
insolvency law and company law or general tort law are concentrated in the same 
court. The law governing these actions, however, is determined independently in 
accordance with the connecting factors of insolvency, company, or tort law, as 
                                                     
96 L Collins et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 15th edn, 2012), 
30-208. 
97 Instead, the lex societatis applies. For the UK, see, e.g., Konamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd 
[2002] 1 W.L.R. 1269. 
98 For example, this is the case in the UK, see West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250. Note 
that Grupo Torras, supra n 90, did not deal with creditor-regarding duties in the vicinity of insolvency, but 
general directors’ duties. 
99 Gourdain, supra n 82, para 5. See also Case C-111/08 SCT Industri AB i likvidation v Alpenblume AB [2009] 
ECR I-5655 (holding that a transfer of shares by the liquidator came within the bankruptcy exception of 
the Judgments Regulation because it was based on a power of the liquidator derived ‘specifically from 
provisions of national law governing [insolvency] proceedings’, which “derogate[d] from the general rules 
of private law and, in particular, from property law”, ibid, paras 27-28). 
100 See Colin Gwyer and Associates Ltd v London Wharf [Limehouse] Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 153. 
101 See the tentative comments by Moss et al, supra n 71, 8.167. 
102 In particular Deko Marty, supra n 82. 
103 Supra, n 72, art 3a(1), as amended. 
104 Ibid, art 3a(2), as amended. Actions are ‘deemed to be related where they are so closely connected that 
it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting 
from separate proceedings’. Art 3a(3), as amended. 
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applicable. Therefore, while the concentration of the actions in one forum may 
generate efficiency gains,105 the potential for conflicting substantive rules or 
regulatory gaps because of the different calibration of the Member States’ 
substantive rules is not addressed.106 
 
Company law 
 
In international company law, the place of incorporation is now the predominant 
connecting factor in the EU. However, controversies remain as regards, first, the 
authority of host Member States to supplement the law of the incorporation state 
by applying some of their rules to companies with most or some of their 
operations within their territory, and second, the reach of the lex societatis. Both 
points are connected because the application of host State provisions in an area 
that falls within the scope of the lex societatis, as determined according to the 
incorporation theory, would require an argument based on public order (ordre 
public) or the mandatory, overriding nature of the provision to be applied.107 On 
the other hand, the application of a provision that falls outside the scope of the lex 
societatis would not require such an argument. To put it differently, if the host 
Member State decides to apply individual rules or sets of rules to companies 
validly incorporated in another Member State, such application is permissible if 
the rule is either, for purposes of private international law, to be classified as falling 
outside of company law (and, hence, governed by a different connecting factor 
that refers to the law of the host State), or it is an overriding norm that applies 
regardless of the application of the home State’s company law.108 In both cases, 
the host State’s rule must, of course, be in compliance with the freedom of 
establishment. It may be argued that the rule is more likely to constitute a 
restriction of the right of establishment in the latter case, because the presumption 
under EU law is that the company is governed comprehensively by the home 
State’s company law, and that the burden for justification is higher, because the 
Court has been reluctant in its existing right of establishment jurisprudence to 
                                                     
105 Proposal for a Regulation, supra, n 72, recital 13b, as amended. 
106 This problem is discussed in more detail infra Section D. 
107 Such provisions are called overriding statutes, lois d’application immediate, or Eingriffsnormen. Overriding 
statutes have been described as ‘crystallised rules of public policy’ and are, thus, related to the notion of 
ordre public, Dicey, Morris & Collins, supra n 96, 1-061. They apply irrespective of the applicable law 
pursuant to the normal conflict rules, ibid, 1-053. If the lex societatis is determined according to the real 
seat theory, assuming that it is still applicable in light of the right of establishment jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice, the host State would, of course, not need to resort to the ordre public or overriding statute 
argument. The only problem would be the demarcation of the part of the host State’s company legislation 
that is in conformity with arts 49, 54 TFEU and the part that could not be applied to a company validly 
established in another Member State. This, in turn, depends on the allocation of regulatory authority 
between the home and host States that we discussed above. Since it is now widely (but not universally, 
see, e.g., Altmeppen and Ego, supra n 91, para 285) accepted that the incorporation theory prevails and 
aspires to offer a comprehensive and exhaustive regulatory regime in the sense of home State control (see 
supra text to n 18), we do not explore this possibility here. 
108 For an example of such an overriding norm in the field of company law see Altmeppen and Ego, supra 
n 91, para 351 (arguing that certain aspects of German capital requirements law should apply irrespective 
of the lex societatis). 
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accept that a restriction is proportionate where the use of an appropriate company 
name puts the creditors on notice that the company is governed by a foreign 
company law system.109 These considerations do not apply in the same way to 
rules stemming from other areas of the host State’s law. On the other hand, the 
Court of Justice does not distinguish explicitly between both cases and questions 
of restriction and justification have to be assessed pursuant to the same basic 
principles of EU law. 
The principles determining the reach of the lex societatis are fairly well 
established in incorporation theory states, but less so in states that have only 
recently, under the impression of the case law of the Court of Justice, begun to 
move towards relying on the registered seat as the main connecting factor. English 
law provides that the law of the place of incorporation governs the formation and 
dissolution of the company and the internal management structure, including the 
composition and rights of the company’s organs, the duties of the directors, the 
potential liability of the members for the debts of the company, the rules on 
distributions, and the right of the members to bring a derivative action.110 The 
demarcation is similar in other incorporation theory states.111 The list shows that, 
while the focus of the lex societatis is on internal management matters, it is not 
possible to draw a clear dividing line between internal and external affairs of the 
company.112 The position of the company’s creditors is a function of several 
concepts that are governed by the lex societatis, as traditionally understood, notably 
the capital requirements of the incorporation law, restrictions on distributions to 
the shareholders, and strategies to pierce the corporate veil, as well as legal 
mechanisms that fall within the domain of contract law in the case of voluntary 
creditors, tort law in the case of involuntary creditors, and insolvency law, as 
discussed in the preceding section. 
The above principles and the case law of the Court of Justice on the 
interpretation of the scope of the Insolvency Regulation and the Judgments 
Regulation113 lead to ambivalent results when applied to the duties in the vicinity 
of insolvency. It is reasonable to argue that the duty to file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings and liability for failure to file, as well as the liability for 
wrongful or fraudulent trading, should be classified as insolvency law. The duty is 
triggered by the company’s insolvency (however defined) and is closely connected 
to the opening of the proceedings, which is explicitly covered by the Insolvency 
                                                     
109 See, for example, Centros, supra n 10, para 36. 
110 See Dicey, Morris, and Collins, supra n 96, Rules 174 and 175(2), with references. See also the 
exception in Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6, art 1(2)(f). 
111 See S Rammeloo, Corporations in Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 2001), 115-122 for 
the Netherlands and 159-163 for Switzerland. 
112 The distinction between internal and external matters has been a concern of private international 
company law for a long time. For a summary of the different approaches see Rammeloo, supra n 111, 20-
23. 
113 Insolvency Regulation, arts 3(1), 4; Judgments Regulation, art 1(2)(b). See supra, text to notes 82-90. 
  
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle and Edmund Schuster                                          The Costs of Separation  
 
 25
Regulation.114 The liquidator is often involved in the action; for example, the 
liability for wrongful and fraudulent trading is imposed on the application by the 
liquidator.115 On the other hand, the duty to file operates before the insolvency 
proceedings have been opened. The Insolvency Regulation is concerned with the 
conditions for the opening, i.e. the procedural aspects of the opening, for example 
who may present the petition,116 but not the duty-based position of the director 
leading up to the opening of the proceedings. While the liability action against the 
director is enforced by the liquidator in some jurisdictions, this may not be the 
case in others. For example, German law distinguishes between two types of 
action by the company’s creditors arising out of the failure to file for the opening 
of insolvency proceedings without culpable delay. The two types derive from the 
same legal basis,117 but they differ in their content. The creditors whose claims 
existed at the time when the duty to file arose are limited to recovering the loss 
suffered because of the delay in filing, i.e. the difference between the recovery rate 
that they could have obtained in the case of timely filing and the actual rate (so-
called ‘rate reduction loss’ or Quotenschaden). Post-duty creditors, on the other 
hand, can claim the loss suffered because they relied on the company not trading 
in a state of insolvency when they entered into the transaction with the company 
(reliance interest or Vertrauensschaden).118 Importantly, the courts have held that the 
rate reduction loss can only be recovered by the liquidator in the course of the 
insolvency proceedings, whereas post-duty creditors have standing to sue 
individually.119 If insolvency proceedings are not opened because of the 
insufficiency of assets, all creditors, including the pre-duty creditors, have standing 
to bring an action individually.120 These differences in the formulation and 
operation of the duties in the Member States create considerable difficulties for an 
autonomous interpretation of the scope of the Insolvency Regulation, and hence 
the determination of the dividing line between the lex societatis and the lex concursus 
at the European level. 
The problems in classifying the directors’ creditor-regarding duties have been 
discussed above.121 Finally, duties relating to the capital structure of the company, 
for example the duty to convene the general meeting and recapitalise the company 
or liability for undercapitalisation (and other variants of the concept of piercing 
                                                     
114 Insolvency Regulation, art 4(2). 
115 UK Insolvency Act 1986, ss 213(2), 214(1). 
116 Virgos-Schmit Report, supra n 83, para 90. 
117 Insolvency Code, s 15a, in conjunction with Civil Code, s 823(2). Leading case is BGH [Federal Court 
of Justice], judgment of 6 June 1994, II ZR 292/91, BGHZ 126, 181 (see ibid, 190-191, confirming, in 
reliance on BGH, judgment of 16 December 1958, VI ZR 245/57, BGHZ 29, 100, that all creditors fall 
within the protective scope of Civil Code, s 823(2), not only those who were already creditors when the 
director should have filed for the opening of insolvency proceedings). 
118 BGHZ 126, 181, 192-201. For a review of the historical development and operation of the German 
rules see M Schillig, ‘The Transition of Corporate Governance to Bankruptcy Governance – 
Convergence of German and US law?’ (2010) 7 ECFR 116, 126-137. 
119 BGHZ 126, 181, 201. 
120 Schillig, supra n 118, 135. 
121 See supra text to notes 98-101. 
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the veil122), do not satisfy the conditions of the Court of Justice for an insolvency 
classification established in Gourdain and Deko Marty.123 However, functionally, 
they are comparable with the legal strategies used to protect creditors in the 
vicinity of insolvency or in insolvency that have been held by courts to fall within 
the scope of the Insolvency Regulation.124 Not surprisingly, in light of these 
ambiguities, the legal situation in the Member States regarding the scope of the lex 
societatis and the delimitation of private international company law and insolvency 
law is characterised by great uncertainty. With respect to almost all of the 
aforementioned legal strategies, views can be found in the same or in different 
Member States that suggest a classification according to company law, insolvency 
law, or yet another field of law.125 
 
Non-contractual obligations 
 
As in insolvency law, the conflict rules determining the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations have been unified in the EU by the Rome II Regulation.126 
According to the views of courts and commentators in some Member States, two 
types of non-contractual obligations may be relevant in the vicinity of insolvency: 
tort law and culpa in contrahendo.127 The connecting factor in tort law is the place 
where the damage occurs, thus leading to the application of the lex damni,128 unless 
the party alleged to be liable and the damaged party have their habitual residence 
in the same country, in which case that country’s law applies irrespective of the 
place where the damage occurs,129 or the tort is ‘manifestly more closely 
connected’ with another country.130 The Regulation defines culpa in contrahendo as ‘a 
non-contractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a 
contract’. Such obligations are governed by the law that applies, or would have 
applied, to the contract.131 Alternatively, if that law cannot be determined, the 
three connecting factors of the private international law rules governing torts 
apply.132 
                                                     
122 See, for example, BGH [German Federal Court of Justice] judgment of 28 April 2008, Az. II ZR 
264/06, BGHZ 176, 204 (‘Gamma’) (discussing the requirements for liability of the shareholders based 
on Civil Code, s 826, for causing the company’s insolvency (existenzvernichtender Eingriff)). 
123 Supra text to notes 82-84, 99. 
124 Supra notes 85-89. 
125 For example, see the opinions reviewed in Altmeppen and Ego, supra n 91, paras 391-405, submitting 
that the duty to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings and liability for failure to file should be 
classified: (1) both as insolvency law; (2) both as company law; (3) duty to file as company law and liability 
as tort law; (4) duty to file as insolvency law and liability as tort law; or (5) both as company law, but with 
the real seat as the relevant connecting factor. 
126 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
(Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40. 
127 Rome II Regulation, art 12. 
128 Rome II Regulation, art 4(1). 
129 Ibid, art 4(2). 
130 Ibid, art 4(3). 
131 Ibid, art 12(1). 
132 Ibid, art 12(2). 
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The dividing line between the Rome II Regulation and company and 
insolvency law is not well established. The Regulation excludes from its scope of 
application ‘non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies […] 
such as the […] internal organisation and winding-up of companies and […] the 
personal liability of officers and members as such for the obligations of the 
company’.133 While, for example, the liability of directors for a breach of duty is, 
therefore, outside the scope of Rome II,134 this is less clear where the directors’ or 
members’ responsibility is not directly related to the company’s internal 
governance structure and does not depend on their position as director or 
member, for example where they are held liable according to principles of piercing 
the corporate veil or because they failed to file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings.135 As regards the latter case, it has been argued that the liability of 
directors should be classified as tort law136 or, with respect to the creditors that 
enter into transactions with the company after the duty arose, as culpa in 
contrahendo.137 Further, where international tort law applies, some commentators 
submit that the rule of the closest connection would lead to an application of the 
law at the COMI.138 However, this approach disregards the subsidiary nature of 
the closest connection as relevant choice of law rule. In addition, given how the 
Insolvency Regulation defines COMI, and leading courts in the EU interpret the 
term,139 it is not clear why this should necessarily be the case. For example, where 
the head office functions are performed in one state but most of the creditors and 
assets are located in another, it is reasonable to assume that the closest connection 
is with the latter state, even though COMI will most likely be in the former, in 
particular if the registered seat is also located there.140 Therefore, different laws 
may apply, depending on the conflict of laws approach of the lex fori, and the 
duties in the vicinity of insolvency may be governed by more than one legal 
regime. 
In addition to such problems of interpreting the conflict rules, the laws of 
many Member States contain broadly phrased, open-ended tort law provisions141 
                                                     
133 Ibid, art 1(2)(d). 
134 See, for example, GP Calliess, Rome Regulations: Commentary on the European Rules on the Conflict of Laws 
(Wolters Kluwer, 2011), Article 1 Rome II, para 51. 
135 Ibid, para 52 (arguing that piercing the corporate veil should be classified as ‘a general problem of (tort) 
law’ and should, therefore, be covered by Rome II). 
136 OGH [Austrian Supreme Court of Justice], decision of 31 August 2006, 6 Ob 163/06y. 
137 H Altmeppen and J Wilhelm, ‚Quotenschaden, Individualschaden und Klagebefugnis bei der 
Verschleppung des Insolvenzverfahrens über das Vermögen der GmbH‘ (1999) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift  673. 
138 For a discussion and references see G Eckert, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht (Wien, Manz, 2010), 369. 
139 See supra notes 72-73. 
140 The main reason why commentators argue that the case is ‘manifestly more closely connected’ with 
the state where the COMI is located seems to be the concern that the director may otherwise be exposed 
to liability pursuant to the lex loci delicti commissi before it is possible to file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings in the second state. For solutions to this problem see Eckert, supra n 138, 369. 
141 The paradigm are arts 1382, 1383 of the French Civil Code. Art 1382 provides that ‘[a]ny act whatever 
of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred, to compensate it’. 
This general tort law provision can be found in many countries of French legal origin, see, for example, 
Belgian Civil Code, arts 1382, 1383; Luxembourg Civil Code, arts 1382, 1383. Countries of other legal 
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that are utilised in the vicinity of insolvency (or before) to hold directors liable for 
acts that harm the creditors.142 If these liability provisions operate independently 
of insolvency situations, it may be natural to classify them as tort law for purposes 
of private international law.143 It is also suggested by some commentators that the 
tort law classification holds for vicinity of insolvency situations.144 In these cases, 
the applicable law is again composed of parts of several national legal systems, 
with the ensuing risk of inconsistent or incomplete regulation. 
 
Other legal areas 
 
The legal strategies outlined above, focussing on duties and ensuing civil liability, 
are in all EU Member States supplemented by administrative and criminal 
sanctions. In some Member States, these sanctions constitute the main deterrent 
to misconduct by directors in the vicinity of insolvency (or, indeed, during any 
stage of a company’s life). Two mechanisms are of particular importance as 
substitutes for other strategies that operate potentially sub-optimally: the 
disqualification of directors and criminal liability in the context of insolvency, 
typically attaching to the misappropriation of corporate assets, fraudulent 
misstatements in the balance sheet or the profit and loss accounts, unlawful 
preference of creditors, or the failure to file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings. Often, these mechanisms are governed by separate conflict rules 
based on different considerations than those underlying private international 
company law or insolvency law. Private international law seeks to identify the legal 
system with the closest connection,145 because it is assumed that this is the most 
appropriate law to govern the case and that applying it conforms to the legitimate 
expectations of the parties.146 Administrative or criminal law, on the other hand, 
seeks to safeguard public interests. It is, therefore, generally restricted in its 
                                                                                                                                       
origin that do not follow the French approach also often employ tort law amenable to flexible 
interpretation and application to different contexts, for example Dutch Civil Code, s 6:162(1) (‘A person 
who commits a tortious act (unlawful act) against another person that can be attributed to him, must 
repair the damage that this other person has suffered as a result thereof’); German Civil Code, s 823(2) 
(the duty to pay damages applies to ‘a person who commits a breach of a statute that is intended to 
protect another person’). 
142 For example, liability pursuant to German Civil Code, s 823(2), was held to be triggered where the 
director violated various  duties of a criminal and insolvency law nature, including, the failure to file for 
the opening of insolvency proceedings, see BGH [Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 06 June 1994, II 
ZR 292/91, BGHZ 126, 181. 
143 See, for example, Hof Leeuwarden, 11 June 2008, JOR 2009, 20; NWA Tollenaar, 
‘Bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid en IPR (II)’, TFZI 2009/7, 206, for Dutch tort law. 
144 For references see Altmeppen and Ego, supra n 91, paras 392, 397. 
145 So-called principe de proximité, see P Lagarde, ‘Le principe de proximité dans le droit international privé 
contemporain’ (1986) 196 Recueil des Cours 9. 
146 M Rheinstein, ‘The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law’ (1944-1945) 19 Tulsa Law 
Review 4, 20. 
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applicability to the territory of the state, but is not concerned with the closest 
connection to the facts.147 
The UK rules on directors’ disqualification148 are a good example. They apply 
to the director of ‘any company which may be wound up under […] the 
Insolvency Act’.149 Because of the wide interpretation of the grounds for winding 
up a foreign company by the English courts, which essentially only presuppose a 
‘sufficient connection’ with the UK,150 the connecting factor is considerably 
broader than that of private international company law or the Insolvency 
Regulation. The tendency to apply disqualification rules more expansively than 
company law proper can also be seen in other countries. The functional substitute 
of the UK directors’ disqualification regime in German law is the requirement that 
company directors shall not have been subject to an order prohibiting the person 
from carrying out a profession that falls within the company’s objects or have 
been convicted of specified criminal offences, in particular insolvency offences.151 
These provisions apply to the directors of private and public limited companies 
formed pursuant to the German legislation and, consequently, with their registered 
seat in Germany. In addition, courts have applied them to directors of foreign 
limited companies with all or almost all of their operations in Germany. In the 
leading case, the German Federal Court of Justice upheld the refusal to register the 
branch of an English private limited company whose sole director was subject to a 
professional ban in Germany, arguing that, ‘as regards the branch, the appointment of 
the director was not valid in light of the mandatory grounds for disqualification 
laid down in s 6(2) of the Limited Liability Companies Act’.152 Thus, the court did 
not question the validity of the appointment of the director from the perspective 
of English company law, but applied the German prohibition to the company as 
far as its operations in Germany were concerned.153 The court explicitly referred 
                                                     
147 See e.g. PJ McConnaughay, ‘Reviving the Public Law Taboo in International Conflict of Laws’ 35 
(1999) Stanford Journal of International Law 255. 
148 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, c. 46. 
149 Ibid, s 22(2). 
150 The case law is summarised by Dicey, Morris, and Collins, supra n 96, Rule 176(2), and Fletcher, supra 
n 79, 3.23-3.45. Fletcher explains that a ‘sufficient connection’ with the UK, which is the main 
requirement for a just and equitable winding-up pursuant to Insolvency Act 1986, s 221(5)(c), may result 
from the location of assets within the jurisdiction, the reasonable possibility that a winding-up order will 
benefit those who apply for the order, and the court’s jurisdiction over persons interested in the 
distribution of the company’s assets, ibid, 3.44-3.45. If the directors’ disqualification falls outside the 
scope of the Insolvency Regulation, as has been argued in the literature (Moss et al, supra n 71, 8.168), 
these common law criteria apply. 
151 Limited Liability Companies Act, s 6(2), sentence 2, no. 2, 3; Stock Corporation Act, s 76(2), sentence 
2, no. 2, 3. 
152 BGH, decision of 7 May 2007, II ZB 7/06, NZG 2007, 592, para 12 (emphasis added). 
153 The court also discussed the compatibility of the application of German law with the right of 
establishment and the 11th Company Law Directive (Directive 89/666/EEC). Relying on Inspire Art and 
Centros, the court argued that the appellant’s conduct constituted abuse and, consequently, the appellant 
was not entitled to invoke the Treaty freedoms. In any case, the restriction was justified in light of 
overriding reasons in the public interest, namely the protection of creditors, minority shareholders, and 
consumers, as well as the integrity of commerce and trade, supra n 152, paras 17-24. The holding was 
codified in 2008 in the Commercial Code, s 13e(3), sentence 2, as amended by Gesetz zur 
Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen (MoMiG) [Law for the 
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to the principle of territoriality and the public interests that the disqualification 
order sought to protect in order to justify the application of German law.154 Where 
such public interests are engaged, market actors are, accordingly, potentially 
subject to more than one regulatory regime.155 
The territoriality principle also governs the international reach of the criminal 
laws of most Member States. Therefore, the general rule is that criminal liability, 
for example for the failure to file for the opening of proceedings without culpable 
delay, transactions in fraud of creditors, incorrect disclosures, and default in filing, 
or falsification of, the company’s accounts and reports, attaches to criminal acts 
committed within the state’s territory.156 Whether criminal liability does, in fact, 
arise, depends on whether the elements of the offence have been satisfied. If some 
of these elements are legally qualified terms, which will often be the case in the 
context of corporate crime, the question is how these incidental questions should 
be treated for purposes of private international law. The classification of incidental 
questions that are contained in provisions of public law does not follow 
universally applicable and accepted rules, but may be judged according to the 
conflict rule of the lex fori applicable to the incidental question or, depending on 
the function of the public law, the forum’s substantive law.157 For duties in the 
vicinity of insolvency or in insolvency, it is convincing to apply the forum’s private 
international law, since the respective elements of corporate crimes are technical 
terms that should be construed as expressed in the conflict rules. In any case, the 
conflict rules may lead to the application of multiple legal regimes, which may give 
rise to friction. For example, where a director who is resident in Member State A 
gives an unlawful preference to creditors and the company’s COMI is located in 
Member State B, the case is governed by the criminal law of Member State A and 
the insolvency law of Member State B. 
 
 
 
D. INCOMPLETE SYSTEMS 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, national legal systems often do not confine 
their efforts of regulating social conflicts arising in relation to companies in the 
                                                                                                                                       
Modernisation of the German Limited Liability Company Law and the Prevention of Misuse], Law of 23 
October 2008, BGBl. I, 2026, art 3(3)(b). It is submitted in the literature that the rules do not only apply 
to the registration of a branch in Germany, but generally when the effects of the legal acts of a company 
director in Germany are at issue, with the consequence that the director would lack actual authority to 
represent the company, Altmeppen and Ego, supra n 91, para 477. 
154 Ibid, para 23. 
155 Other provisions that were held to apply irrespective of the applicable company law are the rules on 
corporate names (eg, German Commercial Code, ss 18, 30), see OLG München [Higher Regional Court 
Munich], decision of 1 July 2010, 31 Wx 88/10, NZG 2011, 157; Kammergericht [Higher Regional Court 
Berlin], decision of 11 September 2007, 1 W 81/07, FGPrax 2008, 35. 
156 Altmeppen and Ego, supra n 91, 617. 
157 J Samtleben, ‚Zur kollisionsrechtlichen  “Vorfrage“ im öffentlichen Recht‘ (1988) 52 RabelsZ 466. 
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vicinity of insolvency to one specific area of law,158 and they have not, at least until 
recently, paid close attention to the ‘classification problem’ – i.e. the problem of 
different connecting factors for different areas of law – in designing their 
regulatory responses. Conflict rules, including the harmonised parts of private 
international law, thus do not always reflect the functionality of the law, and it is 
often essentially random on which side of the different conflict-of-laws boundaries 
a particular regulatory strategy falls.  
It is worth noting that this problem may well affect different Member States 
in systematically different ways. Jurisdictions that traditionally applied the real seat 
doctrine may be expected to have paid less attention to the classification problem 
than incorporation doctrine countries. Their traditional conflicts rules ensured that 
most companies with substantial operations within their territory had to use a 
national corporate form. Thus, when the legislator faced social or economic 
conflicts, or where courts developed legal doctrine to respond to emerging 
problems related to the activity of corporations, company law was as good an area 
of law as any other for addressing the issue. For most of the past century, 
companies operating in real seat states would almost necessarily be subject to the 
national insolvency law, company law, tort law, and criminal law of that 
jurisdiction. In jurisdictions traditionally following the incorporation doctrine, on 
the other hand, the potential dissection of the national legal framework must have 
been much more present in the minds of both legislators and judges. As these 
jurisdictions traditionally permitted companies formed under the law of another 
country to operate within the confines of their national economies, even where 
such companies primarily operated in and thus affected the country of 
incorporation, these legal systems can be expected to have been more careful in 
“localising” their regulatory requirements within their own legal systems. Indeed, 
as can be seen from the discussion above, jurisdictions with a long-standing 
incorporation doctrine tradition seem somewhat better prepared for the type of 
corporate mobility, and thus the ensuing risk of regulatory arbitrage, made 
possible by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. English law, for instance, 
opened the door for foreign companies centuries ago,159 while German law was 
forced into this approach by the Court a mere decade ago,160 and still only accepts 
it in relation to EU companies. Thus, it should come as no surprise that German 
law considered a company law-based approach to director disqualification as 
entirely appropriate,161 although it now seems to adapt to the new situation,162 
while English law casts its net much wider.163 Similarly, the re-characterisation of 
                                                     
158 See also K Schmidt, ‘Grounds for Insolvency and Liability for Delays in Filing for Insolvency 
Proceedings’ in: M Lutter (ed), Legal Capital in Europe (Berlin, De Gruyter 2006) 144, 147, highlighting the 
interplay between rules from different areas. 
159 See Henriques v Dutch West India Company (1728) Ld Raym 1532, 92 ER 494.  
160 Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) [2002] ECR 
I-9919. 
161 See section 76(3) of the German Stock Corporations Act (AktG); see supra text to n 151. 
162 See supra text to n 152. 
163 See supra text to n 148. 
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shareholder loans had originally been created as a company law rule in Germany, 
although the problem the rule tries to address is clearly not confined to domestic 
corporations, and the rule has now been ‘moved’ to insolvency law.164 Similar 
examples exist in relation to other regulatory strategies.  
If the above analysis is correct, i.e. if Member States, particularly Member 
States traditionally following the real seat doctrine, have indeed at least 
traditionally tended to address a variety of problems related to the activities of 
companies in distinct areas of law, this may pose a challenge to the presumption 
of equivalence discussed in section B above. By making use of the freedom of 
establishment, however, companies become subject to less coherent, and often 
overlapping and/or misaligned regulatory regimes from different Member States, 
as conflict of laws rules dissect coherent sets of national legal rules. While it seems 
reasonable to assume that Member State laws are in fact largely equivalent in so far 
as they all attempt to address the most important problems arising from the 
conduct of business in the corporate form – not least because they have strong 
incentives to do so – this no longer holds true where we are concerned with parts 
of national laws. The ‘dissection problem’ presents itself in two different guises, 
which are not equally susceptible to practicable solutions. We will address both in 
turn. 
 
1. CLASSIFICATION PROBLEM 
 
The first problem may arise due to the different categorisation of regulatory 
strategies across Member States. For purposes of this point, we may hypothesize, 
somewhat unrealistically, that most social or economic disputes are addressed in 
relatively discrete, coherent ‘parcels’ of law. Under this assumption, a company by 
exercising the freedom of establishment and triggering different connecting 
factors would become subject to such parcels of law originating from different 
jurisdictions. The different categorisation of these parcels in the Member States’ 
domestic laws would ultimately not be relevant as far as the cross-border 
movements of companies are concerned. It is well established that the 
determination of the applicable law in cases with connections to more than one 
jurisdiction develops along functional lines and not according to the categories of 
the domestic law. The relevant connecting factor is identified through 
classification165 of the problem at hand, i.e. the identification of the conflicts rule 
that governs the situation. While rules of private international law generally use 
                                                     
164 See text to n 89. 
165 Also called ‘characterization’, see E Rabel, The Conflict of Laws, vol 1 (Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Law School, 2nd edn, 1958), 49-50. 
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terminology stemming from the substantive (domestic) law, the interpretation of 
both types of law does not necessarily run parallel.166  
This means that Member States have the possibility to classify the strategies 
addressing the misalignment of incentives in the vicinity of insolvency irrespective 
of their domestic categorisation in a way that functional substitutes of the lex fori’s 
legal strategies become applicable to the case at hand. At least where conflict rules 
are unified, it can be expected that this type of classification along functional lines 
will lead to a coherent regulatory regime for cross-border situations that avoids 
regulatory gaps, since the classification will ultimately be based on a European 
understanding of the relevant areas of law, guarded by the Court. Two problems 
would still persist, however. First, the different national approaches towards 
classification may create considerable legal uncertainty. While this would mainly be 
a temporary problem, it could still act as a powerful de facto restriction of cross-
border mobility of companies until most open questions have been addressed by 
the Court. Second, one may argue that companies in this scenario are subject to a 
complete set of rules, but these rules would have been created by different 
legislators, and the solutions of the problems they address may well be different. 
This would however also hold true where all Member States apply the same 
private international law classification, and if one embraces the benefits of 
legislative competition and horizontal learning between Member States, this would 
certainly not be a prima facie undesirable result. Also, to the extent that the 
argument is based on the undesirability of different outcomes, it bears no weight: as 
described above, the choice between different regulatory solutions, even in a ‘pure’ 
form,167 will not be regarded by the Court as justifying national legislative 
intervention. 
Currently, of course, the Member States are far away from a harmonised 
understanding of the conflict rules and their scope. As the discussion above has 
shown,168 Member States disagree both about the interpretation of the connecting 
factors relevant in the vicinity of insolvency, including those that stem from EU 
law and are, therefore, to be interpreted autonomously, and the reach of the lex 
societatis, lex concursus, and other applicable laws.169 They classify legal strategies 
from different jurisdictions that operate as functional substitutes differently, with 
the consequence that none of the substitutes may apply, or more than one 
cumulatively, depending on the distribution of the COMI, registered seat, and 
other connecting factors across Member States. For example, the liability for 
failure to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings and its functional 
equivalents (fraudulent and wrongful trading, action en responsabilité pour insufissance 
                                                     
166 This is the case even if the classification is governed by the lex fori, which is now the prevalent view 
(for a discussion of the different views see ibid, 52-66), because the conflicts rule must be sufficiently 
open-ended to capture not only domestic, but also foreign legal relationships. 
167 See text to n 16. 
168 Section C.2. 
169 See also Schmidt, supra n 158, at 146. 
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d’actif) are classified in some countries as company law,170 in others as tort law,171 
and yet in others as insolvency law.172 Assume that a company is incorporated in 
Member State A, which addresses the problem of a delay in the filing for the 
opening of insolvency proceedings under the rubric of wrongful trading, classified 
as insolvency law. Assume further that the company has its COMI in Member 
State B, which classifies liability for the failure to file as company law. If 
insolvency proceedings are opened in Member State B, the court will determine 
the applicable law according to the location of the registered seat. Conflict of law 
rules generally refer to the domestic (substantive) law as well as the conflict rules 
of the lex causae, here the law of A.173 The conflict rules of A are interpreted by the 
courts of B from the perspective of the lex causae.174 From that perspective, the 
question at hand is one to be solved by, and classified as, insolvency law. 
Consequently, A’s conflict rules declare that the law of B as the law at the place of 
the COMI is applicable. The renvoi now only refers to B’s internal law, not to rules 
of private international law.175 Depending on how B’s courts will treat the issue, 
regulatory gaps may arise since the liability provision is not part of insolvency law 
from B’s point of view.176 
Now assume that the company’s COMI is located in a Member State that 
classifies the liability for the failure to file as tort law.177 If most of the company’s 
creditors are based elsewhere, say, in Member State C, then the place where the 
damage occurred within the meaning of the Rome II Regulation is C178 and, 
consequently, the law of this Member State is applicable.179 The reference is to the 
internal law of C.180 Therefore, the courts of the Member State where COMI is 
located would need to analyse the director’s potential liability according to legal 
instruments that are not designed to address the problem at hand. 
Finally, assume that the company is incorporated in Germany and its COMI 
is located in England. The English court opens insolvency proceedings and the 
                                                     
170 For example Germany, but the issue is controversially debated, see the references in Altmeppen and 
Ego, supra n 91, para 391. 
171 Austria, see supra n 136. 
172 France and UK, see supra notes 87-88. 
173 See, for example, Introductory Law to the German Civil Code, art 4(1), sentence 1. 
174 Kropholler, supra n 182, § 16 I. 
175 This is a consequence both of the character of the Insolvency Regulation’s referral, see Virgos-Schmit 
Report, supra n 83, para 87, and the private international law of many Member States, see, for example, 
Introductory Law to the German Civil Code, art 4(1), sentence 2. 
176 Private international law doctrine offers certain possibilities for the courts of B to take recourse to 
other areas of internal law than those determined through A’s classification (in our example insolvency 
law), see infra text to notes 182-183. However, clear rules on how this problem is to be treated do not 
exist. 
177 See, e.g., supra notes 171, 136. 
178 Rome II Regulation, art 4(1). 
179 Unless the applicable tort law is determined according to the closest connection, which is interpreted 
as being automatically the COMI. This seems to be the opinion of the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, 
see the reference supra n 136. However, this approach is difficult to reconcile with the text of the Rome II 
Regulation and the definition of COMI by the Insolvency Regulation, see supra text to notes 139-140. 
180 Rome II Regulation, art 24. 
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liquidator may apply to the court for an order declaring that the director is liable 
for wrongful or fraudulent trading. Classification problems do not exist; the 
English court simply applies its own insolvency law. However, according to the 
case law of the German Federal Court of Justice, creditors whose claims came into 
existence after the duty to file arose have standing to enforce their claims 
independently of the insolvency proceedings.181 Therefore, the director is 
potentially subject to two liability regimes cumulatively, even though the English 
law is structured to regulate the social conflict comprehensively. 
These problems of regulatory gaps or overlaps of legal strategies can, of 
course, be solved by ‘adapting’ either the respective conflict rules or the applicable 
substantive law. For example, it is possible that the courts of Member State B in 
the first scenario will interpret the referral from A’s law to the internal law of B 
expansively so as to encompass B’s liability provisions, even if they would not do 
so for purposes of the initial classification. The notion of ‘adaptation’ has been 
developed in conflict of laws precisely to overcome the above friction that arises 
when two legal systems apply to one social problem.182 However, adaptation has 
the disadvantage of being highly fact-specific and not following generalizable rules. 
Rather, it is performed by the judge on an ad-hoc basis in the individual case to 
achieve an equitable outcome. Therefore, it adds to the legal uncertainty created by 
the differences in the interpretation of the conflict rules that still prevails in the 
EU.183 
 
2. FUNCTIONAL COMPLEMENTS 
 
The problem of incomplete systems goes far beyond the difficulties stemming 
from diverging classification, however. Functional interdependencies between 
national legal rules may impede the functioning of a domestic rule that is used by 
private international law to reassemble a regulatory framework applied to a 
‘foreign’ company. 
Even where functional substitutes across jurisdictions can correctly be 
identified, and consistent classification ensures replacement of inapplicable legal 
instruments with such substitutes, this does not ensure coherence and 
compatibility within the reassembled framework. If and to the extent that 
applicable rules rely on functional complements from their own national legal 
system that do not exist in the host state (and that are situated outside of the 
transplanted parcel of law), problems will still arise.  
                                                     
181 Supra n 118. 
182 J Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 6th edn, 2006), § 34; J Schröder, Die 
Anpassung von Kollisions- und Sachnormen (Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1961). 
183 See PH Neuhaus, ‘Legal Certainty versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws’ (1963) 28 Law and 
Contemporary Problems. 795, 801. 
                           6/2014 
 
 36
A similar friction is well-known and much-discussed in the context of ‘legal 
transplants’.184 In the context of migrating companies it is brought about by the 
dissection of legal systems through conflicts rules, rather than by national 
legislators seeking inspiration abroad. The extent to which this poses a problem, of 
course, depends on the intensity of the cross-doctrinal interdependencies. In some 
cases the problem may well be manageable. After all, national courts have been 
dealing with similar problems in cross-border situations for centuries, as 
interdependencies between different foreign rules may play a role whenever a legal 
concept enters another jurisdiction. In other cases, however, a rule may rely on 
surrounding fields of law or on national institutions to an extent that it loses its 
meaning and function when having to operate outside its usual environment. In 
some cases, this problem has partly been addressed through harmonisation, e.g. 
where accounting rules, company law, and insolvency law interact.185 In other 
circumstances, problems still persist. For example, the dissection mentioned above 
will often result in the separation of a ‘duty to file’ from the ‘triggering event’, i.e. 
the definition of the point in time after which a company is regarded as insolvent 
under the applicable law.186 It seems obvious that divergences in the grounds for 
opening an insolvency proceeding (which are to be determined based on the 
COMI-law) change the operation of a filing duty (where the prevailing view is that 
it forms part of company law). 
Moreover, solutions to economic and social problems – unsurprisingly – have 
developed across different areas of law and discrete functional substitutes to these 
regulatory solutions will often simply not exist. In order to illustrate this point, it 
may be useful to distinguish between three distinct stages in a company’s life: first, 
insolvency or a time near insolvency when it should be clear that the company will 
not be able to avoid going into insolvent liquidation; second, a period of financial 
distress, during which it is, however, still reasonable to assume that the company 
will avoid becoming insolvent; and third, any time before the company 
experiences financial distress. While some legal strategies operate during all three 
stages, many can be associated with, or are designed to apply to, one of them in 
particular. Avoidance actions, the duty to file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings, liability for the failure to file, for causing or aggravating the 
company’s insolvency (action en responsabilité pour insufissance d’actif or responsabilidad 
concursal), or for wrongful or fraudulent trading, all require that the company is 
                                                     
184 See A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 
2nd edn, 1993); see also H Spamann, ‘Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion 
of (Corporate) Law’ (2009) Brigham Young University Law Review 1813. 
185 See the Fourth (Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 on the annual accounts of certain 
types of companies, OJ L 222/11), Seventh (Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 on 
consolidated accounts, OJ L 193/1), and Eighth Company Law Directives (now Directive 2006/43/EC 
of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, OJ L 157/87). 
Important differences do still exist, however, especially outside of the scope of application of the IFRS 
Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002/EC of 19 July 2002 on the application of international 
accounting standards, OJ L 243/1). 
186 See e.g. Eckert, supra n 138, 376, and the discussion in section C.2 above. 
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insolvent, that there is no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvency, or that the 
director caused or contributed to the insolvency. These duties are supplemented 
by administrative and criminal sanctions that also require the company’s 
insolvency. In addition, a number of strategies relating to the company’s capital 
structure operate during or in the vicinity of insolvency, for example the duty to 
recapitalise or liquidate or the reclassification of shareholder loans as equity. 
Before insolvency, but during times of financial distress, fiduciary duties may 
require the directors to pay particular regard to the interests of the creditors, and 
the aforementioned mechanisms designed to protect the company’s capital are 
already of importance. Finally, before the company nears insolvency, the regular 
duties of directors intend to ensure that the company is managed prudently. In 
addition, stringent capital requirements may influence the likelihood that the 
company will experience financial distress at a later stage. 
Functional interdependencies exist both between the legal strategies within 
each group and between different groups. In any given legal system, more than 
one strategy is employed to address any one of the three social problems: harming 
creditors when the company is insolvent by continuing to trade or giving unlawful 
preference; excessive risk-taking when the company experiences financial distress; 
and the prudent management of a going concern. The respective strategies are, 
therefore, functional complements. Some of these functional complements may be 
selected, and others de-selected, by virtue of diverging connecting factors. When 
this is the case, it is necessary to find a functional substitute in the lex causae that 
applies pursuant to the conflict rule. Such a substitute may be identified through 
classification based on the relevant social conflict, in which case the applicable law 
continues to function harmoniously. In many cases, however, a perfect substitute 
will not exist because legal systems are conceptualised differently and operate in a 
distinct institutional environment. Adaptation187 may not possible where the legal 
instruments that function as substitutes are too different or their efficacy depends 
on legal or institutional conditions that are not present, and cannot easily be 
replicated, in the other jurisdiction. We may encounter this problem with respect 
to strategies addressing the same social problem, i.e. falling within the same of the 
three groups outlined above, for example where one state relies primarily on civil 
sanctions and the other on criminal sanctions to prevent companies from trading 
in a state of insolvency. The problem is even more pronounced where legal 
systems exploit the interdependencies between the different groups and focus, for 
example, on fiduciary duties before insolvency, or alternatively, on remedies 
during the insolvency stage, to protect creditors. 
Take, for example, a rule like the ‘recapitalise or liquidate’ requirement.188 The 
rule clearly addresses the problem of limited liability companies continuing their 
operations at a time of waning equity,189 and thus tries to reign in on the same 
perverse incentives as the liability for a breach of the duty to file or wrongful 
                                                     
187 See supra text to n 182. 
188 See supra Table 1. 
189 See e.g. Enriques, supra n 21, 28. 
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trading prohibitions. It may well be the case that this regulatory solution is a 
response to weaknesses in other, more direct, strategies in the relevant jurisdiction. 
But it would be difficult to view a ‘recapitalise or liquidate’ requirement as 
belonging to any area other than company law, even when taking a functional 
approach to the classification process. Similarly, some company laws require 
directors to manage a company in the interest of shareholders and stakeholders.190 
While also clearly a company law rule, such a provision will likewise have an 
impact on the acceptability of risk-taking by near-insolvent companies in the 
relevant jurisdiction, and its existence will have played a role in shaping other parts 
of the law. Another important example of interdependencies is the interaction 
between civil and criminal enforcement. In some jurisdictions, for example 
France, enforcement takes place largely through criminal litigation, on which 
shareholder may ‘piggyback’.191 The French regulatory regime constraining 
managerial decision-making would not be complete if the criminal sanctions, and 
the institutional apparatus used to enforce them, were disregarded. This part of the 
regulatory architecture, of course, will not be ‘imported’ where the lex fori refers to 
French law as lex causae and the criminal act has been committed within the 
territory of the lex fori. 
Finally, a problem that cannot be solved through functional classification, 
harmonious interpretation of the scope of the applicable law, or adaptation is the 
focus of jurisdictions on different, but interconnected social conflicts in their 
regulatory regimes. In some countries, for example Spain or Portugal, fiduciary 
duties of directors are generally considered to be under-enforced. This does not 
seem to be so much a function of the deficient formulation of the duties in the 
company laws of these jurisdictions,192 rather than the consequence of a traditional 
attitude of passivity or reluctance towards private enforcement. However, the 
courts in these legal systems have forceful tools at their disposal to hold directors 
of an insolvent company liable who violate their duties before or in the vicinity of 
insolvency, and in practice most enforcement indeed takes place once a company 
has become insolvent. Under Spanish law, and similarly under Portuguese law, the 
insolvency will be qualified as either ‘accidental’ or ‘culpable’.193 The latter is the 
case if the insolvency has been caused or aggravated by intentional or grossly 
negligent acts of the director.194 Intent or gross negligence is presumed, among 
                                                     
190 See e.g. Austrian law, which explicitly provides for the management of a company to be conducted in 
the interest of the company, its shareholders, its creditors, and the public interest; see section 70 Austrian 
Stock Corporation Act. 
191 M Gelter, ‘Why Do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe’ (2011-2012) 37 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 843, 887-888. 
192 Both countries contain a catalogue of well-defined, comprehensive duties of company directors and 
liability provisions, see Spanish Companies Act [Ley de Sociedades de Capital], ss 225-232; Portuguese 
Code of Commercial Companies [Código das Sociedades Comerciais], ss 64, 72, 78-79. 
193 Spanish Insolvency Act [Ley Concursal], s 163. For Portugal see Insolvency and Business Recovery 
Code [Código da Insolvência e da Recuperação de Empresas], ss 185-189 (in particular liability pursuant 
to s 189(2)(e), as amended by Law 16/2012). 
194 Spanish Insolvency Act, s 164. 
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other reasons, if the director breached the duty to file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings.195 In the case of a culpable insolvency, the court may, in 
its discretion, impose liability on all or some of the de jure or de factor directors who 
acted intentionally or grossly negligently for all or parts of the shortfall in the 
company’s assets.196 A showing of causality between the breach of duty, for 
example the late filing, and the deficit in the company’s assets is not required. In 
addition, the affected directors will be disqualified for at least two, and up to 15 
years.197 
These sanctions are stronger than the functional substitutes available in other 
legal systems, for example UK or German law. In the UK, the liability for 
wrongful trading is commonly interpreted as being compensatory in nature, i.e. 
directors are liable to make a contribution to the company’s assets commensurate 
with the amount by which the assets have been depleted because of their conduct.198 
The German liability provisions for failure to file without culpable delay generally 
restrict the amount recoverable to the rate reduction loss (Quotenschaden). They 
consequently also require a causal connection between the director’s conduct and 
the loss suffered by the company.199 On the other hand, it can be said that these 
legal systems are somewhat more balanced because they also support considerable 
enforcement of directors’ duties before insolvency, which arguably reduces the 
risk of the company experiencing financial distress and eventually having to file for 
insolvency.200 The general directors’ duties before insolvency are classified as 
company law for purposes of private international law, whereas the liability 
provisions under Spanish or Portuguese insolvency law satisfy the definition of 
‘closely connected action’ as developed by the Court of Justice and, therefore, fall 
within the scope of the lex concursus as determined by the Insolvency Regulation. If 
we now assume that a company’s registered seat is located in a jurisdiction that 
focuses on the insolvency stage in order to address behaviour harmful to the 
creditors’ interests, such as Spain or Portugal, and the COMI in a jurisdiction such 
as the UK or Germany, we observe what may be termed ‘weak selection’ of legal 
rules: the application of the two sets of rules that are the weaker components of 
the investor protection regimes of their respective jurisdictions, to the exclusion of 
the more effective instruments. 
Thus, the interplay of corporate mobility and the diversity of connecting 
factors may jeopardise the underlying rationale of the ‘choice of law’-model that 
                                                     
195 Ibid, s 165(1). 
196 Ibid, s 172bis, as amended by Law 38/2011. 
197 Ibid, s 172(2). 
198 In Re Produce Marketing [1989] 5 BCC 569, 597. 
199 An exception exists for post-duty creditors, see supra, text to n 118. 
200 The imbalance in Spanish law is attenuated by the existence of a provision imposing strict liability on 
directors for violating their duty to convene the general meeting and either recapitalise or liquidate the 
company where the company’s losses exceed half of its equity capital, Spanish Companies Act, s 367. 
This provision has been litigated frequently and constitutes a significant liability risk for directors of 
Spanish companies. A comparable provision does not exist under Portuguese law, where the violation of 
the duty to recapitalise or liquidate only triggers criminal liability, which requires that the director acts 
intentionally, Code of Commercial Companies, s 523. 
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the Court has effectively adopted. Furthermore, the gaps created by a lack of 
compatibility between different legal regimes may ultimately open the door to 
inefficient regulatory arbitrage of a ‘cherry picking’ kind. The problems are likely 
to be most acute where effective regulation relies on functional complements, i.e. 
where two or more legal fields necessarily interact and no clear or ‘natural’ 
boundary exists between them, as in the case of addressing the incentives of 
company directors and shareholders in the vicinity of insolvency. 
 
 
 
E. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
What follows from our analysis? As has been argued above, the dissection of legal 
rules through what we regard as an incoherent approach to defining the regulatory 
spaces of Member States in the EU impedes corporate mobility and may at the 
same time create scope for inefficient types of regulatory arbitrage. The EU 
approach to corporate mobility is based on a presumption of equivalence which 
extends beyond the scattered areas of company law harmonisation. This 
presumption, however, loses its justification as Member State laws are dissected 
into discrete bundles of rules that are then stitched together by the applicable 
conflicts rules. Instead of choosing between competing – but coherent and 
complete – legal systems, incorporators can thus increasingly cherry-pick rules and 
exploit regulatory gaps that do not, in this form, exist in any one Member State, 
but are a mere consequence of dissection.  
As outlined above, the problem is likely to be most prominent in areas such 
as creditor protection in the vicinity of insolvency, where almost all jurisdictions 
use regulatory tools from different areas of law – typically at least from both 
insolvency law and company law – to create a coherent legal framework. Although 
this is a suitable showcase, the problem is in no way limited to these situations, 
however, since functional interdependencies exist across virtually all areas 
corporate law seeks to address. 
Is this a problem that can be solved without interfering with the Treaty 
freedoms? A strict real seat approach would avoid dissection in most cases, but as 
follows from Überseering,201 such an approach is incompatible with the Treaty 
freedoms. It would also prevent European companies from capitalising on the 
many benefits choice of law brings with it. 
It is of course open to Member States to harmonise the relevant areas of law. 
The equivalence presumption may ultimately be based on Article 50(2)(g) TFEU, 
which provides a basis for the harmonisation of ‘safeguards […] for the protection of the 
interests of members and others’. If, as is argued here, problems exist that are 
intrinsically connected to the exercise of the Treaty freedoms, then this may seem 
                                                     
201 Supra n 11. 
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a viable way. In reality, however, it is highly unlikely that Member States would 
ever agree to a level of harmonisation that would solve the problems identified 
above, given that such harmonisation would need to be far-reaching and cut 
across various different areas of law to address the problem of functional 
complements. If the experiences with the Takeover Directive,202 the European 
Company,203 or group law204 are any guidance, it seems highly unlikely that 
harmonisation of (at the very least) company and insolvency law in all relevant 
aspects is a realistic option.205 In addition, apart from the theoretical problems, 
harmonising in the all-encompassing manner that would solve the problem is of 
questionable desirability. It would decrease the room that Member States have for 
experimentation, and most importantly it would preclude any tailoring of 
regulatory solutions to the particular needs of national economies, circumstances, 
and societal preferences. 
Alternatively, one may rely on the development of reliable, functionally-based 
criteria to solve the classification problem. There is little doubt now that what 
constitutes insolvency law for the purposes of EU law is subject to a coherent, 
unitary interpretation. Member States cannot, therefore, simply decide for 
themselves whether to frame a particular rule as insolvency or company law and 
thus achieve a wider or narrower scope of application.206 Even if uncertainties 
exist now, they are likely to vanish over time. However, as pointed out above,207 
this is only a solution where clear and discrete functional substitutes can be 
identified across different jurisdictions, and even then the problem of 
interdependence beyond the specific solutions would persist. Thus, even a 
coherent EU-wide approach to the classification problem is unlikely to solve the 
problem.  
Alternatively, one could call for the Court to take into account the problems 
described here when assessing the compatibility of ‘intrusive’ national rules applied 
to foreign-incorporated companies. Member States would then be better placed to 
justify an application of national law to foreign-incorporated companies, 
irrespective of the rules’ private international law classification, based on the 
factual inefficacy of otherwise applicable home state laws. In fact, nothing in the 
Court’s jurisprudence prevents Member States from adopting this approach, but 
the strictness with which Gebhard has been enforced in the past casts doubts over 
the ability of Member States to create workable solutions along these lines. It 
seems clear based on Inspire Art that the approach would call for tailor-made 
solutions for each specific home state-host state pair, since the necessity of 
                                                     
202 See e.g. PL Davies, EP Schuster, and E Van de Walle de Ghelcke, ‘The Takeover Directive as a 
Protectionist Tool?’ (2010) ECGI Law Working Paper No. 141/2010, available at 
http://ssrn.com/paper=1554616. 
203 See e.g. Rickford, supra n 6, 1238-1243. 
204 See Forum Europaeum Corporate Group Law, ‘Corporate Group Law for Europe’ (2000) 1 European 
Business Organization Law Review 165; on this and other failed harmonisation projects see e.g. Armour and 
Ringe, supra n 15. 
205 Note also that partial harmonisation is unlikely to solve the problem. 
206 This is what Armour (supra n 1 at 403-404) terms the ‘partition theory’. 
207 See text to n 166-183. 
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‘intrusive’ legislation can only be assessed against the situation created by this 
particular pairing. In a single market, such tailoring of national legal systems to 
each of the possible pairings is clearly neither a workable nor a desirable solution 
to our problem. 
It appears to us that the most efficient way to address the problem – at least 
as far as creditor protection in the vicinity of insolvency is concerned – would be 
to use a single connecting factor for both company law and insolvency law.208 It is 
clear that this approach would not solve all problems, since, as we have shown 
above, the interdependencies go beyond company and insolvency law; in fact, it 
may create new problems, for example by being less responsive to the needs of 
certain types of creditors who expect the application of the law of the COMI. 
However, it seems that at this stage of integration of Member States’ domestic 
laws it is virtually unavoidable that some friction remains, at least if one wants to 
maintain choice of law in this area.209 On the other hand, the main source of 
friction is the lack of alignment between insolvency and company law. The 
potential negative effects of the single connecting factor approach are likely to be 
outweighed by the benefits of legal certainty, foreseeability, and the minimisation 
of regulatory gaps or the accumulation of legal strategies, which entail distortions 
in the form of over-incentivising or impeding the use of the Treaty’s free 
movement rights.210  
It is submitted that the case for this approach is particularly strong in light of 
the different regulatory strategies used by Member States when addressing the 
vicinity of insolvency problem. The debate about ‘abusive transfers of COMI’211 
clearly shows that the current COMI approach falls short of offering the kind of 
protection to creditors it was designed to achieve. Instead, it creates inefficient 
equilibria, as creditors cannot prevent change of the COMI – since this is a mere 
factual change they have no control over – and should therefore rationally price 
their financial exposure to the company assuming that the company will open 
insolvency proceedings in what is from their perspective the least beneficial 
                                                     
208 See Armour, supra n 1, and Ringe (2008), supra n 2, who also suggest ‘tying COMI to the place of 
registered office’. 
209 Note that a single connecting factor solution could in theory also be achieved by requiring companies 
to keep their headquarters in the country of incorporation. If adopted by all Member States, the effect 
would resemble a Union-wide application of the real seat theory without, however, constituting a breach 
of the Establishment chapter; see the Cartesio decision, supra n 22, declaring a Hungarian rule to this effect 
compatible with the Treaty. This is also the solution adopted for the SE (Art 7 of the SE Statute); see on 
this WG Ringe, ‘The European Company Statute in the Context of Freedom of Establishment’ (2007) 7 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 185, questioning the compatibility of this provision with the Treaty. After 
the Court’s holding in Cartesio, however, it seems that such a solution would indeed be compatible with 
the Treaty, even though it would effectively remove choice of law in this area. 
210 See supra A. 
211 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, COM(2012) 744 final (12.12.2012), available 
at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency-regulation_en.pdf>; see e.g. Ringe, supra n 2; F 
Mucciarelli, ‘The Hidden Voyage of a Dying Italian Company, from the Mediterranean Sea to Albion’ 
(2012) 9 European Company and Financial Law Review 571; Armour, supra n 1 at 408. 
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insolvency jurisdiction. This jurisdiction will differ depending on the type of 
creditor, and thus different creditors may assume different ‘least beneficial’ 
insolvency laws, leading on aggregate to the mispricing of corporate debt. Even 
absent abuse, or prescient regulatory arbitrage, the incompatibilities described here 
have the potential to cause friction and legal uncertainty for companies with cross-
border operations. Subjecting the company to the insolvency law of the 
incorporation state, on the other hand, would likely increase legal certainty, 
minimise the friction arising from incoherent and conflicting legal rules, and 
potentially lead to more efficient pricing of company’s debt, as creditors can rely 
on the application of a known and coherent legal system.212 Moreover, a 
company’s changing of the connecting factor for insolvency law would only be 
possible in ‘lockstep’ with a change of the applicable company law. Since 
reincorporation always requires disclosure as well as some sort of regulatory or 
court intervention, creditor protection mechanisms could easily be attached to this 
procedure – as they currently are for cross-border mergers.213 
 
 
                                                     
212 See Armour, supra n 1 at 411. 
213 See Art 4(2) of the Cross-border Merger Directive (Directive 2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers of 
limited liability companies, OJ L 310/1). 
